The forgotten insurgency: is there hope for Colombia? by Longhurst, Ricky M. & Lopez, Jesus K.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2005-12
The forgotten insurgency: is there hope for Colombia?
Longhurst, Ricky M.












Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 





Ricky M. Longhurst 





 Thesis Advisor:   Robert O’Connell 
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including 
the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and 
completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any 
other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington 
headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 
1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project 
(0704-0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE  
December 2005 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE:  The Forgotten Insurgency: Is There Hope For 
Colombia? 
6. AUTHOR(S) Longhurst, Ricky M. and Lopez, Jesus K. 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING 
ORGANIZATION REPORT 
NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
     AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official 
policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
Colombia’s four decades-old insurgency has been largely forgotten by the United 
States.  With U.S. attention diverted towards Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Middle East, Colombia 
has undertaken a new strategy to deal with problems of the insurgents, paramilitaries, and 
narco-terrorists which have plagued the country since 1948.  The current administration of 
Colombian President Alvaro Uribe has shifted strategy from one of negotiation and 
concessions to an active campaign to restore security and state control throughout Colombia.  
Under the Democratic Security and Defense Policy, the Uribe administration has made great 
strides against the insurgents and their supporters. 
This thesis analyzes President Uribe’s efforts to end the insurgency and those of his 
predecessor Andres Pastrana.  It also analyzes U.S. aid in the form of Plan Colombia which is 
largely tied to counternarcotics efforts.  The highest U.S. priority is to stem the flow of illegal 
narcotics from Colombia into the U.S. Colombia’s priority is to restore security and state 
control first, thereby providing a stable foundation to battle the narcotraffickers.  Uribe has 
shown there is hope for Colombia to end the insurgency through his efforts.  The U.S. should 
shift its priorities to mirror Colombia’s and thereby earn a valuable, peaceful, and stable partner 
in the Western hemisphere. 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES 97 
 
14. SUBJECT TERMS  Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, FARC, FARC-EP, ELN, AUC, 
Paramilitaries, Colombia, President Uribe, President Pastrana, Government of Colombia, Insurgency, 
Drug Trade, Guerrilla Organization, Plan Colombia, Democratic Security and Defense Policy, 

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  
























THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
THE FORGOTTEN INSURGENCY: IS THERE HOPE FOR COLOMBIA? 
 
Ricky M. Longhurst 
Major, United States Air Force 
B.S., University of Texas at San Antonio 
 
Jesus K. Lopez 
Major, United States Air Force 
B.A., New Mexico State University 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 











Authors:  Ricky M. Longhurst  
 
 
Jesus K. Lopez 
 
 




































Colombia’s four decades-old insurgency has been largely forgotten by the United 
States.  With U.S. attention diverted towards Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Middle East, 
Colombia has undertaken a new strategy to deal with problems of the insurgents, 
paramilitaries, and narco-terrorists which have plagued the country since 1948.  The 
current administration of Colombian President Alvaro Uribe has shifted strategy from 
one of negotiation and concessions to an active campaign to restore security and state 
control throughout Colombia.  Under the Democratic Security and Defense Policy, the 
Uribe administration has made great strides against the insurgents and their supporters. 
This thesis analyzes President Uribe’s efforts to end the insurgency and those of 
his predecessor Andres Pastrana.  It also analyzes U.S. aid in the form of Plan Colombia 
which is largely tied to counternarcotics efforts.  The highest U.S. priority is to stem the 
flow of illegal narcotics from Colombia into the U.S. Colombia’s priority is to restore 
security and state control first, thereby providing a stable foundation to battle the 
narcotraffickers.  Uribe has shown there is hope for Colombia to end the insurgency 
through his efforts.  The U.S. should shift its priorities to mirror Colombia’s and thereby 
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While pursuing its wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States has lost focus 
on other terrorist organizations and insurgencies around the world including the 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).  This group has been in existence for 
over forty years and poses a significant threat to U.S. interests in Colombia and to 
regional security/stability in Latin America.   The FARC’s stated goal is to establish a 
Marxist state in Colombia. According to its website, the group says it aims “to overcome 
the great economic, social, cultural, ethnic and political inequalities” in Colombia.1  To 
accomplish their objectives, the FARC utilizes military and political expansion in rural 
areas, which the state has abandoned. Gaining control of territory is a key to controlling 
the population.  In fact, this strategy has allowed the FARC to maintain and increase its 
political and military supremacy throughout many regions in the Colombian countryside 
which is where insurgents re-organize, gain momentum, and plan future attacks.   
Members of the FARC routinely coerce many of the poor citizens in the countryside to 
join the insurgency and advance their revolutionary cause. 
  
Although the objectives of the governments of Colombia and the United States 
differ in some aspects; the major goals overlap somewhat. The greatest difference is the 
order of priority for each country.  The primary U.S. objective is to prevent the flow of 
illegal drugs into the United States, the secondary and tertiary goals are to promote 
political and economic stability. The primary objectives of Colombia are to promote 
political and economic stability first; this would in turn help in the war against drugs. 
Both U.S. and Colombian objectives have also evolved over time from a strict counter 
narcotic focus to encompass counterterrorism activities.  Essentially, the United States’ 
objectives serve to treat the symptoms and not the disease.  This thesis argues that U.S. 
objectives should mirror those of the Colombian government in their attempt to end the 
insurgency which in-turn will support the battle to stem the flow of illegal drugs.    
 
                                                 
1 FARC-EP online, available from http://www.farcep.org; Internet; accessed on 25 July 2005. 
2 
Plan Colombia, a six-year plan to end Colombia’s long armed conflict, eliminate 
drug trafficking, and promote economic and social development was developed  by 
former President Pastrana, is due to expire at the end of  FY2005.  The United States total 
fiscal commitment to Plan Colombia, including $1.7 billion of Foreign Military 
Financing and Department of Defense central narcotics account, is $4.5 billion.  President 
Uribe (2002-present) has continued the work of Plan Colombia, but with an increased 
emphasis on security concerns.  He initiated a strategic level campaign, called the 
Democratic Security and Defense Policy, to recapture the guerilla controlled territory and 
restore state control and presence in regions where it does not exist.  This thesis argues 
that the United States would benefit significantly by supporting President Uribe’s 
objective to regain the rural areas.  Not only would this limit the insurgent’s ability to 
recruit from the population, but it would also limit their ability to plan, mobilize, and 
execute future missions while residing in safe havens.  Eliminating the support base for 
the insurgents is vital to defeating them.  As such, the United States must shift its focus 
from primarily trying to eradicate narcotics trafficking to supporting the fight against the 
insurgents.  Helping the Colombians eliminate the insurgency will go a long way towards 
winning the war on drugs and promoting political and economic stability in Latin 
America. 
B. THESIS PURPOSE, SCOPE, METHODOLOGY, AND ORGANIZATION 
Colombia is plagued by more than one revolutionary group and paramilitary 
organization. However, this analysis focuses mainly on the FARC since it is the largest 
and most powerful of these organizations and as such, poses the greatest threat to the 
state.  Where relevant, information is given on the other major insurgent and paramilitary 
groups, namely the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the United Colombian Self-
Defense Organization (AUC).  These other groups are important players in the 
insurgency and their role will be discussed as appropriate throughout the analysis.  The 
insurgency is over forty years old and relevant historical background will be given on 
Colombia and the insurgency.  The focus of the analysis, after background information is 
given, will be on actions taken by the most recent government administrations in 
Colombia and the U.S. 
3 
This thesis is based on the study of primary and secondary literature on the 
subject of Colombia and counterinsurgency.  A relevant historical background will be 
given on Colombia and the FARC.  The recent actions of the Pastrana and Uribe 
administrations in Colombia will be discussed as well as the FARC responses to these 
actions.  In particular, Plan Colombia and the Democratic Security and Defense Policy 
will be analyzed.  Case studies of two successful counterinsurgencies (El Salvador and 
Peru) will be analyzed for any relevant lessons which may be applied to Colombia.  This 
will be followed by the application of a counterinsurgency model to the current situation 
in Colombia as a method to analyze the current approach of the Colombian government.  
Best practices from successful counterinsurgencies throughout history will also be 
applied as a measuring stick for the effectiveness of Uribe’s approach.2  The thesis will 
conclude with specific recommendations for policy makers in Colombia and the United 
States based upon the research outlined here. 
                                                 
2 The counterinsurgency model used to analyze Colombia is taken from an article written by Dr. John 
A. Lynn entitled “Patterns of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” Military Review (July-August 2005), 
available on <http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/English/JulAug05/ lynn.pdf>, 
accessed on 25 August 2005.  The best practices from successful counterinsurgencies come from an article 
written by Dr. Kalev I Sepp entitled “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” Military Review (May-June 
2005), available from <http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/cac/milreview/download/English/MayJun05/ 
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II. BACKGROUND ON COLOMBIA AND THE INSURGENCY 
A. COMING OF THE INSURGENCY  
The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia, or FARC) traces their roots back to the warfare of the late 
1940’s and were formally organized in the mid 1960’s.3  The FARC is the strongest and 
best organized of the leftist guerrilla groups which sprung up in Colombia during its four-
decade-old insurgency crisis.  The FARC was organized among peasants living in the 
remote and isolated mountainous areas between Bogotá and Cali. 
 
Figure 1.   Map of Colombia 
In these rural areas, largely devoid of government presence, the FARC operate 
with freedom, continue to exert violence, and continually devour any hopes of a stable 
                                                 3 Nina M. Serafino, Colombia: Current Issues and Historical Background, (New York: Nova Science 
Publishers, Inc., 2003), 33.  
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democracy in Colombia.  That has not always been the case.  A quick look at the history 
of Colombia indicates that there once was a flourishing economy, and stable government. 
Historically, Colombia has had one of the most stable economies in Latin 
America.  Unlike El Salvador, Nicaragua, or Guatemala, Colombia is a nation with a 
history of respected democratic institutions, robust international trade, sound and reliable 
economic institutions and industries, a respect for human life, community, family, and 
human rights, with a potentially bright future.4  In fact, the economy enjoyed 
uninterrupted growth from 1932 until the mid-1990’s—an exceptional performance even 
by the standards of developed countries.5  However, the fall of coffee prices in the world 
market, and a complex political crisis, significantly affected the Colombian economy 
during the 1990’s into the 21st century.  Sadly, the economy grew just 1.6 percent in 
2001, well below the five percent growth rate needed to substantially decrease poverty 
levels and unemployment—currently running at 64 percent and 20 percent of the 
population, respectively.6  Moreover, the economy is hampered by an unequal 
distribution of income—the wealthiest 20 percent receive 55 percent of the national 
income, while 17 percent of the income is received by the lowest 50 percent.7  Other 
contributing factors to the diminishing economy include U.S. sanctions leveled at 
Colombia during the Clinton administration, reduced business confidence, and the 
decertification by the United States.   
The decertification of Colombia by the United States in 1996 was designed to cut-
off particular types of aid that the country was receiving from the U.S.  Types of aid 
included Foreign Military Financing, International Military Education and Training 
funds, investment guarantees for U.S. businesses through the Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation, and trade financing for U.S. business through the EXIM Bank.8  
                                                 4 Bob Graham, Brent Scowcroft and Michael Shifter, “Toward Greater Peace and Security in 
Colombia, Forging a Constructive U.S. Policy” (2000), available from <http://www.cfr.org/publication/ 
3828/toward_greater_peace_and_security_in_colombia.html>, accessed on 12 August 2005, 27. 
5 Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its 
Implications for Regional Stability, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001), 4. 
6 William Aviles, “Institutions, Military Policy, and Human Rights in Colombia,” Latin American 
Perspectives (January 2001), 37. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Nina M. Serafino, Colombia: Current Issues and Historical Background, (New York: Nova Science 
Publishers, Inc., 2003), 92. 
7 
The overall aim of the decertification was to put political pressure on the administration 
of President Ernesto Samper.  The Clinton administration stated:  “Samper had 
disregarded U.S. warnings of cartel contributions to his campaign; found that Colombia 
was not cooperating fully on counter-narcotics efforts; and cited limited cooperation by 
the Colombian government and ‘pervasive corruption’ under the Samper administration, 
and deemed the presidency untrustworthy.”9  In addition, the on-going war on drugs 
within the country severely dampened the relationship with our Latin American neighbor 
as the United States became increasingly skeptical of corrupt government officials whose 
rhetoric against drugs was much stronger than their actions. Essentially, the combination 
of a declining economy, a drug war, and U.S. skepticism inevitably led to a weakened 
state that is now Colombia. 
Colombia’s multiple problems stem from a state that no longer has the capacity to 
govern or perform key functions, and in many respects, negatively affects the Andean 
region not through its strength but through its weakness as a nation state.  Corruption has 
damaged many of the country’s key institutions, including political parties and the 
Congress, judicial system, and the executive branch of the government.10 A fundamental 
manifestation of a modern state is its “monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force,” 
but Colombia today, in counterpoint to this classic definition, endures instead under 
conditions of “multiple sovereignty.”11  Rempe contends: “A situation now exists 
between government, insurgent, and paramilitary forces in which:  1) competing interest 
groups are so violently opposed on highly salient issues that their differences cannot be 
reconciled within the current political system; and 2) two or more competing groups have 
sufficient resources—political, financial, organizational, military—to establish 
‘sovereignty’ over a substantial political or military base, and thus seek to achieve their 
goals by force.12  Unfortunately, the situation in Colombia represents a broader global 
                                                 
9 Nina M. Serafino, Colombia: Current Issues and Historical Background, (New York: Nova Science 
Publishers, Inc., 2003), 91. 
10 Bob Graham, Brent Scowcroft and Michael Shifter, “Toward Greater Peace and Security in 
Colombia, Forging a Constructive U.S. Policy” (2000), available from <http://www.cfr.org/publication/ 
3828/toward_greater_peace_and_security_in_colombia.html>, accessed on 12 August 2005, 9. 
11 Dennis Rempe, The Past as a Prologue?: A History of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in Colombia, 
1958-66, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002), 35. 
 12 Ibid. 
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trend that is all too familiar in the current conflicts on-going in Iraq and Afghanistan 
where weakened states are riddled by insurgencies and violence.  In a lecture to the Johns 
Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies in 2004, then U.S. Secretary of State 
Colin Powell explained that, “we used to worry almost exclusively about the power of 
states. Today we also have to worry about the weakness of states—states that allow or 
can’t prevent insurgents from plotting mass murder on their soil, and states that provide 
the breeding ground for terrorist recruits.”13  The violence, criminal activities, severe 
human rights and humanitarian problems, and corruption are to a great extent the product 
of a state that has not been capable of performing its most elementary functions—
protecting its citizens and upholding the rule of law.14  The Colombian government’s 
priority is to provide a secure environment in order to address the multiple fundamental 
problems.  Rempe contends:  “In the long run, policymakers must focus their efforts 
towards building a more democratic and inclusive society in Colombia, constructing a 
policy which recognizes that achieving state security ‘is not synonymous with the 
security of a nation.’  Ensuring state stability is vital, but an equal, long-term 
commitment to democratization, social reform, institutional development, and economic 
progress.”15  An instable environment, combined with a government that has little to no 
influence, and a declining economy provides an insurgency such as the FARC with the 
exact ingredients needed to thrive.  In the chaotic environment of Colombia, 
preconditions exist for a revolution where the FARC will continue to find a country ripe 
for control, violence, and terrorist operations. 
The organization of FARC came on the heels of the period known as La Violencia 
or “The Violence” which occurred from 1948-1958.  This violent period in Colombian 
history began with the assassination of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán on 9 April 1948. A leader of 
the liberal party, Gaitán’s murder set off a massive riot known as El Bogotazo and 
                                                 
 13 Colin L  Powell, Keynote address to the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced 
International Studies (SAIS), 60th Anniversary Gala Dinner 13 October 2004. Embassy of the United 
States, London – UK Online, available from <http://www.usembassy.org.uk/terror525.html> (accessed 1 
August 2005). 
14 Bob Graham, Brent Scowcroft and Michael Shifter, “Toward Greater Peace and Security in 
Colombia, Forging a Constructive U.S. Policy” (2000), available from <http://www.cfr.org/publication/ 
3828/toward_greater_peace_and_security_in_colombia.html>, accessed on 12 August 2005, 10. 
 15 Dennis Rempe, The Past as a Prologue?: A History of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in Colombia, 
1958-66, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002), 36. 
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sparked a civil war between the two main political parties, the Liberals and 
Conservatives.  Over a decade an estimated 200,000 people died, several others were 
displaced, and every region in Colombia was affected.16  The end of La Violencia came 
in 1958 with the establishment of Frente Nacional (the National Front) where both 
parties signed an agreement which established a policy to alternate control of political 
power every four years.  This agreement lasted sixteen years until 1974. 
The FARC’s origins can be traced to the mid-1960’s where they banded together 
in a remote cluster of “independent republics” near the central Magdalena River valley.  
In the beginning, the leftist guerrilla organization espoused Marxist-Leninist ideology 
and aspired “to overcome the great economic, social, cultural, ethnic and political 
inequalities” in Colombia.17  The FARC was determined to change the social structure in 
Colombia and reshape society by attracting the masses in an attempt to overthrow the 
current regime.  However, no matter the inequities of economic, social, and political 
power, the population resisted change in the form of a revolution and sided with the 
established system of “elite democracy.”18  In an effort to obtain funds and attract forces 
the FARC decided to exploit the narcotics industry which paid huge dividends.  The 
FARC is involved in every aspect of the narcotics supply chain with an estimated annual 
income today of over $500 million.19  The influx of money to the organization made it 
easy to attain recruits by the thousands.   
The organization expanded slowly from the mid-1960’s through the mid-1980’s 
and were deemed a mere nuisance while drawing little attention from the government.  
The revolutionaries engaged in ambushes of military units or raids on farms with the 
objectives of securing equipment and food.  The insurgents were essentially “out of sight, 
out of mind” until they began to pose a serious security threat to Bogotá and other urban 
areas. According to the FARC manifesto of May 1966, the insurgents were more 
                                                 
16 Colombia Human Rights Network Online, “An Overview of Recent Colombian History,” available 
from <http://colhrnet.igc.org/timeline.htm>, accessed on 13 October 2005. 
17 FARC-EP online, available from http://www.farcep.org; Internet; accessed on 25 July 2005. 
18 Thomas A. Marks, Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic 
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002), 7. 
19 Joseph R. Nuñez, Fighting the Hobbesian Trinity in Colombia: A New Strategy for Peace, (Carlisle, 
PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2001), 8. 
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concerned about survival in the face of a determined effort by the Colombian army to 
eliminate it.20 The FARC established a second and third guerilla front in 1969 and 1971 
respectively in an early attempt at expansion.  In the 1980s, the FARC began to 
implement an aggressive expansion strategy that was set at its 1982 Seventh 
Conference.21 According to Dave Spencer, a veteran of both the El Salvadoran and 
Colombian conflicts, now one of the top U.S. specialists on insurgency: 
The goal was the creation of a 28,000-man army divided into 48 guerrilla 
fronts.  In 1982, FARC was just a small organization of 15 fronts with 
maybe 200 guerrilla fighters.  By 1990 it had expanded its forces to 43 
fronts with about 5,000 fighters.  Now it has between 15-20,000 
combatants in 60 fronts and mobile companies (these formations range 
from 60 to 400 individuals).  This has allowed them to move to mobile or 
maneuver warfare, the use of large units capable of directly confronting 
military units of equal size, of overrunning installations and smaller 
units.22 
The organizational structure of the FARC has evolved over time in the expansive 
sense, yet remains a hierarchical model.  From day one, the FARC has been led by their 
commander, Manuel Marulanda Vélez, alias Tirofijo or “Sureshot,” however, overall 
command falls to a seven-man secretariat.23  The secretariat coordinates the strategic 
aspects of the organization while each member also remains the leader of one of the 
seven large, regional bloques.  Additionally, the secretariat reports to a central command, 
or the Estado Mayor Central, which currently incorporates approximately 25 members 
(the size has varied).24  Below each bloque, approximately 66 fronts exist to execute local 
planning and operations.   Commissions exist under each front.  The Commission’s role 
is three-fold in that it exercises control over the local militia (which serve intelligence, 
logistics, extortion and financing, and propaganda), a mobile company (which represents 
the fronts personal offensive arm), and at least two columns.  Each column is finally 
divided into two companies.  Company guerrillas are uniformed soldiers who routinely 
                                                 
20 Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its 
Implications for Regional Stability, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001), 24. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Thomas A. Marks, Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic 
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002), 7. 
23 Ibid., 79. Manuel Marulanda Vélez is the nom de guerre of Pedro Antonio Marin. 
24 Ibid. 
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execute tactical operations for the organization such as kidnappings, or attacks against 
civilian and/or government forces.  The organizational structure of the FARC is depicted 
in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.   FARC Organizational Structure25 
The organizational structure of the FARC allows for centralized control and decentralized 
execution.  The fronts have the autonomy to commit acts of terrorism when and where 
they choose without the decision coming either directly from Tirofijo or his secretariat.  
Also, successfully targeting and capturing Tirofijo would not have as great an impact on 
the FARC as did the capture of the Shining Path of Peru’s revolutionary leader Abimael 
Guzman.  The capture of Guzman, which will be detailed later in this paper, essentially 
ended the Shining Path revolution.  The FARC, with its several factions, would continue 
to operate and wreak havoc in Colombia.   
B.  THE PASTRANA ADMINISTRATION AND THE FARC 
President Pastrana assumed office in August 1998 and was not the first 
Colombian president to pursue negotiations with the insurgents. Pastrana believed the 
possibility of a negotiated peace with the FARC had a greater chance of success over 
previous efforts because of a widespread popular demand for peace and the recent 
involvement of Colombian business and civic groups in the peace process.26  Pastrana 
pursued a three-pronged peace initiative: (1) to pursue peace talks with the insurgents, (2) 
to strengthen the Colombian military into a more effective fighting force, and (3) to 
                                                 
25 Darren D. Sprunk, “Transformation in the Developing World:  An Analysis of Colombia’s Security 
Transformation” (Thesis, The Naval Postgraduate School, 2004), 31. 
26 Thomas A. Marks, Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic 
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002), 79. 
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secure international economic support, military assistance, and aid to institute social and 
political reform (Plan Colombia).27  His administration, along with the Clinton 
administration in the United States, co-authored Plan Colombia.  Plan Colombia will be 
discussed in greater detail in the following chapter. 
To show his good faith in the negotiation process, President Pastrana responded to 
the demands of the FARC that a demilitarized zone be created and that all Colombian 
security forces be withdrawn from this demilitarized zone.  An area roughly the size of 
Switzerland with a population of approximately 96,000 was ceded over to the FARC.28  
In their study for RAND Corporation, Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and 
Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability, Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk 
have this to say about President Pastrana’s attempts at negotiations: 
The Pastrana administration staked a great deal of its credibility on the 
negotiation of a peace agreement with the country’s major guerrilla 
organization, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).  In 
November 1998, within four months of his inauguration, the President 
withdrew Colombian military forces from a 42,139 square kilometer 
“demilitarized zone” (zona de despeje) in south central Colombia, which 
the FARC demanded as a condition for negotiations.  Although the idea of 
negotiations enjoyed considerable support, Pastrana’s approach entailed 
substantial political costs, including the resignation of Defense Minister 
Rodrigo Lloreda in May 1999, and stresses between the government and 
the military.  Lloreda objected to the negotiating approach articulated by 
Pastrana’s negotiator, which implied the indefinite FARC control of the 
zona de despeje.  Despite government concessions, the FARC continued 
the attacks on government and infrastructure targets, kidnappings, and 
other acts of violence and disruption.29 
This zona de despeje proved to be a windfall for the FARC.  They now had a sanctuary 
where they could operate with impunity.  They could train, rest, refit their forces, move 
                                                 
27 Thomas A. Marks, Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic 
Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002), 79. 
28 Gabriel Marcella, The United States and Colombia: The Journey From Ambiguity To Strategic 
Clarity, (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2003), 35. 
29 Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its 
Implications for Regional Stability, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001), 3. 
13 
drugs and arms and hold prisoners and hostages.  This area became a staging base for 
FARC operations into the surrounding areas outside of the demilitarized zone.30  
The concessions made by the Pastrana administration to the FARC did not result 
in any negotiated peace settlements.  The FARC really had no incentive to actively 
pursue peace negotiations; they were not in danger of being defeated by Colombian 
government forces.  In fact, the demilitarized zone given up by the Pastrana 
administration had only served to strengthen the FARC.  Both sides continued in the 
negotiation process because they each had an interest in the peace process.  The Pastrana 
administration had staked its credibility on the negotiations and the FARC hoped to gain 
legitimacy, domestic and international stature, and achieve strategic and operational 
advantages.31  Probably the greatest advantage gained by the FARC was the ability to 
operate freely within the demilitarized zone. 
C.  THE URIBE ADMINISTRATION AND THE FARC 
Dario E. Teicher, author of The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-
Terrorism says, “In early 2002, the final days of Colombian President Andres Pastrana’s 
administration were marred by an unending internal war against right wing and leftist 
narco-terrorists and criminal cartels.  During his administration the narco-terrorists 
reached their zenith of power.”32  This was the legacy that President Alvaro Uribe 
inherited when he assumed office in August of 2002.  President Uribe was elected on a 
platform of an uncompromising hard-line stance towards the insurgency.33  Uribe’s focus 
was improving internal security.  Officially released in June 2003, the plan titled 
Democratic Security and Defense Policy outlined his priorities for Colombia.  Uribe’s 
plan was built upon these three basic tenets: 
1. A lack of personal security is at the roots of Colombia’s social, economic, 
and political ills. 
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2. This lack of personal security stems from the absence of the state in large 
swaths of the national territory. 
3. Therefore, all elements of national power need to be directed towards 
ending this lack of national integration.34 
President Uribe came into office keenly aware of the dynamic synergy of insurgency, 
narco-trafficking, kidnapping, illicit arms dealing, extortion and homicide.  His main 
course of action was to consolidate control of national territory.35  
President Uribe realized that a top-down strategic approach was necessary if the 
government of Colombia was to gain ground against the insurgents.  Uribe’s Democratic 
Security and Defense Policy provided the strategic approach the Colombian government 
would use.  It contains the following strategic objectives:36 
1. Consolidation of state control throughout Colombia 
2. Protection of the population 
3. Elimination of the illegal drugs trade in Colombia 
4. Maintenance of a deterrent capability 
5. Transparent and efficient management of resources 
The Democratic and Security Defense Policy will be discussed in greater detail in the 
following chapter, but it is essential to note that President Uribe has taken and entirely 
different approach in dealing with the insurgency than did his predecessor.  Fortunately 
for Uribe, the military had taken the initiative and began transforming itself to better cope 
with the insurgency during the administration of President Pastrana.37 
The new military leadership which emerged during the Pastrana administration 
realized the only way to successfully counter the FARC was through transformation of 
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the existing military structure.38  Thomas A. Marks says the following about the 
Colombian military’s transformation: 
They had crafted their approach based upon the neutralization of FARC’s 
strategy, even as they instituted a far-reaching and comprehensive military 
reform process that affected everything from recruiting (a largely draftee 
COLAR became one-third volunteer, with key units essentially 100 
percent “professionals”), to military schooling, to assignment policies, to 
structure, to operational art.  The result was a reclaiming of the strategic 
initiative by the Uribe advent.39 
Thus, President Uribe inherited a military already on its way to transforming itself into a 
more effective counterinsurgency force.  Uribe chose to take the fight to the insurgents by 
denying them safe havens and restoring state control where previously there had been 
none.  By mid-2002, Uribe had a military more capable of implementing his plan to 




















                                                 
38 Thomas A. Marks, Sustainability of Colombian Military/Strategic Support for “Democratic 
Security,” (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2005), 3. 
39  Ibid. 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
17 
III. FARC ADAPTATION AND GOVERNMENT RESPONSES 
A. CURRENT FARC STRATEGY AND TACTICS 
The strategy and tactics of the FARC have evolved since the beginning of the 
insurgency.  As the FARC slowly expanded between the 1960s and 1980s, so did their 
level of combat capability and their ability to progress toward larger and more complex 
operations.  During this period, it was common for the guerrillas to engage in ambushes 
of military units, raids on farms, or kidnappings.  The main objectives were capturing 
military equipment, securing food and supplies, capturing hostages, and settling scores 
with informers.41  Additionally, the FARC remained in relative rural isolation obscured 
from the Colombian army thus avoiding direct confrontations that could limit the ability 
of the guerrillas to grow.  After the Seventh Guerrilla Conference (1982), the FARC 
began to refocus its aims and its structure from those of a bandit organization (hit and run 
tactics) to those of an aspiring guerrilla army (more traditional conventional attacks), now 
being able to concentrate its forces by employing coordinated “multi-front” attacks of 
several hundred men against specific, vulnerable targets including military bases.  In one 
attack during March 1998, approximately 700 FARC fighters ambushed the 52nd 
counter-guerrilla battalion of the Colombian Army’s 3rd Mobile Brigade stationed at El 
Billar, south of the Caqueta department.  The surprise attack caused the battalion heavy 
casualties where over 60 were killed and some 40 were taken prisoner.  Similar attacks 
occurred throughout the late 1990s into the 21st century. These attacks would exploit 
existing vulnerabilities in rural military bases and showcase the guerrilla groups’ strength 
in the eyes of the Colombian government and the international community.  The FARC’s 
move to maneuver warfare, consisting of what have been called medium-size unit 
concentrations, is considered to be potentially more flexible against Colombian military 
with more devastating results.  In fact, twice as many people are murdered each year in 
this country of less than 40 million as in the entire United States with its population of 
roughly 280 million.42  According to the United Nations, Colombia’s population of 1.5 
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million internally displaced people is the third largest in the world, following Sudan and 
Angola.43  Between 1996 and 2000, some 800,000 Colombians left their country, many 
to the United States, Canada, Europe, and other Latin American countries because of the 
FARC.44  For many, conditions were simply too dangerous in Colombia.  Human rights 
abuses are among the most prevalent in the hemisphere.  In the past decade, the conflict 
claimed more than 35,000 Colombian lives.45  The increased growth of the FARC that 
enabled these multi-front attacks against the Colombian military and continued violence 
toward civilians is due to a number of conditions. 
 The FARC engages in numerous activities to raise money including kidnapping.  
Over the past decade, the FARC has kidnapped a presidential candidate, a senator, a 
bishop, and a governor, to just name a few; and averages over 3,200 kidnappings per 
year.46  It is difficult to establish the amount of income earned by the FARC for 
kidnappings.  However, the National Human Development Report: Solutions to Escape 
the Conflict’s Impasse 2003, published by the United Nations Development Program, 
estimates the annual income received from kidnappings is approximately $32 million 
dollars, or approximately 10 percent of their total income.47 The practice of kidnapping 
makes the FARC easier to label as a terrorist organization.  The 2001 Report on Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations released by the U.S. Department of State included the FARC for 
the first time.48 At this point, the FARC fell under the Bush administration’s Global War 
on Terrorism.  According to the 2002 National Security Strategy of the United States, 
President Bush states:  “In Colombia, we recognize the link between the terrorist and 
extremist groups that challenge the security of the state and drug trafficking activities that 
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help finance the operations of such groups.”49  The fact is that the kidnappings of United 
States citizens and many other countries’ citizens provokes international backlash against 
the FARC which only hurts the organization’s cause.  However, in the FARC’s view, 
kidnappings continue to provide a valuable source of income. 
A second and more lucrative source of income for the FARC is narcotics and 
extortion.  Since the 1980s, the FARC has become involved in every step of the narcotics 
supply chain including taxation of every facet of the drug trade.  The same United 
Nations National Human Development report estimates the FARC’s revenue from drug 
trafficking to be $204 million dollars or 61 percent of their annual income.50 Colombia 
provides some 80 percent of the cocaine entering the United States and produces some 70 
percent of the world’s total.51  Proceeds from narco-trafficking allow the FARC to train, 
equip, recruit, and enjoy power in a country where little authority exists.  In addition, 
drug revenues minimize the need for widespread popular support because the narcotics 
money finances their logistical requirements. 
Narcotics not only provide a tremendous source of income and power for the 
FARC, but are an important recruitment means as well.  The poor economic condition of 
the country leaves many youth with few opportunities. Child soldiers (members under the 
age of 18) comprise a great deal of FARC recruits which are estimated at over 6,000.52  
The youth are motivated by a desperate desire to escape the poverty that afflicts the vast 
majority of ordinary Colombians including their families.  As many of the adolescents 
choose or are forced to join the insurgency, many of their families decide to cultivate 
coca.  In either case, the increased prospect of financial relief and freedom exists to the 
youth who join the revolution, and the land owners who are pressured into farming coca 
crops.  In return the FARC says that it provides protection, a term that can be construed 
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as extortion or as quasi-governmental control.  Extortion is estimated to provide the 
FARC with $96 million or approximately 29 percent of their annual income.53  As 
Francisco E. Thoumi explains in his work, Illegal Drugs, Economy, and Society in the 
Andes, the entire scheme of the drug trade in Colombia deeply affects the identity of the 
country. He states: 
Drugs have influenced the Andean countries’ social, political, and 
economic systems; they have determined how people do business, the role 
these countries play in the international economic and political system, the 
way domestic politics is practiced, and how people look at themselves.54 
For the FARC, although the drug trade touches all aspects of Colombian social, political, 
and economic life, narco-trafficking is a major factor in the overall grand strategy. 
 FARC activities over the past decade indicate their desire to follow the strategic 
plan implemented during their Seventh Conference in 1982.  Drawing from the writings 
in the Colombian Labrynth, Rabasa and Chalk state the following as the FARC’s grand 
strategy:55 
1. First, to consolidate its control of coca-growing regions in the southern 
and eastern part of the country. Control of the resources in these areas 
enables the guerrillas to build up their military capabilities and push into 
other areas. 
2. Second, to expand the theater of operations to the entire country, so as to 
force the government to disperse its forces and reduce its ability to regain 
the military initiative. At the same time, the guerrillas seek to expand into 
economically strategic areas, such as the middle Magdalena valley and the 
central highlands. To do this, the FARC is striving to control a number of 
strategic corridors that link the FARC’s base in the zona de despeje to the 
Pacific coast and to northeastern Colombia and the Venezuelan border and 
                                                 
53 United Nations Development Program, National Human Development Report: Solutions to Escape 
the Conflict’s Impasse 2003, table 12.1., available from <http://www.pnud.org.co/2003/EnglishVersion/ 
Chapter12.pdf>, accessed 11 August 2005. 
54 Francisco E Thoumi, Illegal Drugs, Economy, and Society in the Andes. (Washington D.C.: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2003), 1. 
55 Angel Rabasa and Peter Chalk, Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and Insurgency and Its 
Implications for Regional Stability, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2001), 39-41. 
21 
permit the rapid movement of troops, arms, and supplies across the 
country. (See Figure 3.) Some of the most intense fighting over the past 
two years has been over control of these corridors. 
3. Third, to isolate the capital, Bogotá, and other major cities. Perched at 
6000 feet on the western slope of the eastern cordillera of the Andes, 
Bogotá is dependent on a few easily interdicted roads for land 
communications with the external world.  The FARC and the ELN 
regularly sever road communications between the capital and the Atlantic 
coast, the Amazonian region, and the eastern plains. 
4. The final stage in the FARC’s strategy would be a move to large-scale 
offensive operations, culminating in a general uprising.  To this end, the 
FARC has been building urban support networks in Bogotá and other 
cities. The FARC’s new phase of warfare (multi-front attacks) includes the 
use of 60mm and 81mm mortars and homemade bombs fired from a tube, 
known as cylinder bombs. 
 
Figure 3.   Rabasa & Chalk, Figure 4.153 
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A significant reason for the FARC’s ability to execute their grand strategy and 
enjoy continued success in Colombia is because of their extremely profitable financial 
resources via kidnapping, narcotics, and extortion, which allows them to rely less on 
popular support.  Additionally, as mentioned above, the FARC leadership is committed to 
executing the grand strategy drawn up almost 25 years ago.  However, the 
implementation of Plan Colombia, and the hard-line approach taken by the Uribe 
administration may force the FARC to alter their strategies if they want to remain in 
existence. 
B.  PLAN COLOMBIA  
Plan Colombia was developed by former Colombian President Pastrana as a six-
year plan to end the country’s 40-year old armed insurgency, battle narcotics trafficking, 
and to promote economic and social development.56  The primary portion of the United 
States’ support of Plan Colombia is the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI).  Colombia 
also receives assistance from the United States in the form of Foreign Military Financing 
(FMF) and money from the Department of Defense’s (DOD) central counternarcotics 
account.  ACI funding for Plan Colombia from fiscal years 2000 through 2005 has 
totaled approximately $2.8 billion.57  When FMF and DOD funding is included, the total 
amount of U.S. support is $4.5 billion.58  Since funding for Plan Colombia expires at the 
end of fiscal year 2005, the Bush administration has requested an additional $463 million 
in ACI and $90 million in FMF for fiscal year 2006.59 
From the United States’ perspective, Plan Colombia was an initiative to stem the 
flow of illegal narcotics into the United States by taking the fight to the world’s main 
source of coca production, Colombia.  The heart of proposal in the early years (2000 and 
2001) was the “Push into Southern Colombia” program.60  Coca cultivation had been 
expanding rapidly in southern Colombia and the guerrillas were behind much of this 
increased coca cultivation and related activities.  The majority of the funding for this 
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program was to be spent on organizing, training, and equipping two counternarcotics 
battalions.  The funding allocated for these two battalions was $600 million for fiscal 
years 2000 and 2001 combined.61 
Prior to the passage of any legislation appropriating funds for Plan Colombia, the 
U.S. Congress placed conditions on the government and military of Colombia to be 
eligible to receive money.  Six conditions and one restriction were added to Plan 
Colombia by Congress.62  There was a limitation placed on the use of helicopters 
provided by Plan Colombia funding.  Any use of a helicopter(s) to aid and abet the 
operations of the illegal self-defense groups would result in the helicopter(s) being 
returned to the United States.  A U.S. personnel cap was placed at no more than 500 total 
military personnel and no more than 300 civilian contractors.  A funding cap was set for 
DOD counternarcotics funds.  Another limitation was the limit on the use of DOD funds 
to the types allowable in the legislation.  Basically the limitations allowed only non-lethal 
assistance like protective and security equipment, repair parts, software, and related 
items.  Another restriction prohibited the issuance of visas to any person “credibly 
alleged to have provided direct or indirect support for the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC), the National Liberation Army (ELN), or the United Colombian Self-
Defense organization (AUC), including conspiracy to allow, facilitate, or promote the 
illegal activities of such groups.”63  The last two restrictions dealt with population 
planning and the prohibition of the use of any funds for Plan Colombia other than those 
appropriated by the legislation enacting Plan Colombia.64 
Other stipulations put into the legislation by Congress before the obligation of 
funds for Plan Colombia dealt with human rights issues.  The human rights criteria 
stipulated that the President of Colombia bring to justice any member of the Colombian 
military guilty of human rights abuses.  The Colombian Armed Forces and its 
Commander General were also required to self-police and bring to justice any person 
alleged to have committed human rights abuses or to have aided or abetted paramilitary                                                  
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groups.  The Colombian government and military was also supposed to cooperate fully 
with civilian authorities in investigating, prosecuting, and punishing anyone guilty of 
human rights abuses.65  The U.S. Congress placed these human rights compliance 
stipulations on Colombia to minimize public and international backlash against the U.S. 
government for appearing to support an abusive and oppressive regime.  The U.S. was 
highly criticized during its early involvement in El Salvador for supporting a regime 
which committed extensive human rights abuses.  This topic will be dealt with in more 
detail in a subsequent chapter. 
U.S. policy has evolved over time from a strictly counternarcotics focus to also 
allow Plan Colombia funds to be used to conduct counterterrorist operations.  In 2002, 
Congress approved legislation which expanded authority to use U.S. counternarcotics 
funds in a unified campaign against both drug trafficking and terrorist organizations in 
Colombia.66  The three largest illegally armed organizations in Colombia—the leftist 
FARC, ELN, and the rightist—AUC have all been designated foreign terrorist 
organizations by the State Department.67 
C.  ASSESSMENT OF OBJECTIVES 
Strides have been made in drug eradication and internal security within Colombia, 
but there has been no measurable change to the availability of illegal drugs in the U.S.  In 
her 2005 Congressional Research Service (CRS) report, Plan Colombia: A Progress 
Report, Connie Veillette is critical of Plan Colombia’s success at stemming illegal drugs 
flowing into the U.S.  She says, “Despite increased eradication of drug crops and 
interdiction efforts under Plan Colombia, U.S. government agencies responsible for 
tracking drug trends report that the availability, price, and purity of cocaine and heroin in 
the United States have remained stable.”68  Drug eradication efforts have indeed resulted 
in the destruction of thousands of acres of illicit drug crops.  Unfortunately, many of the 
drug crops that have been eradicated either manually or via aerial spraying have just been 
replanted.   Data from the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) for the year 
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2004 show that the total area under cultivation for coca has remained stable.  The same 
report argues that although the total area cultivated for coca has remained stable, coca 
production has actually diminished slightly from 460 metric tons in the previous year to 
430 metric tons because the newly-planted crops are not as productive.69  This has only 
forced a shift of the growing to other regions within Colombia or movement of 
cultivation to other nations.   
Violence and crime have decreased in Colombia, but it still reports one of the 
highest (if not the highest) kidnapping rates in the world.  According to Connie 
Veillette’s progress report, public safety conditions have improved and more police have 
been redeployed to areas from which they had been driven out by armed insurgents.70  
Colombians feel safer now, but internal security remains a tremendous problem and the 
ongoing insurgency coupled with the narcotrafficking continues to exacerbate the 
problem.   
D.  DEMOCRATIC SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY  
In 2002 President Alvaro Uribe realized that Plan Colombia, by itself, would be 
insufficient to solve Colombia’s problems.  Upon taking office, he directed that the 
Democratic Security and Defense Policy for Colombia be drafted and enacted.  The 
Democratic Security and Defense Policy is the strategic road map for Colombia to restore 
order and the legitimacy of the state’s institutions.  President Uribe sets the tone for the 
policy by saying, 
Security is not achieved simply through the efforts of the Armed Forces 
and the National Police.  This is an effort of the entire State and of all 
Colombians.  A strong state structure, supported by citizen solidarity, 
guarantees the rule of law and the respect of rights and civil liberties.71 
President Uribe put the Ministry of Defense in charge of conceptualizing the 
framework of democratic security and defense.  Defense Minister Marta Lucia Ramirez 
de Rincon in turn realized she needed not just military expertise, but also help from the 
other branches of government.  She assembled a team comprised of members of the 
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Ministry of Defense, the armed forces, the War College, and the National Police to 
analyze and design the best solutions to the country’s security problems.72  The Defense 
Minister also brought together representatives from all the other government ministries to 
ensure the plan incorporated all the necessary state institutions for greater coordination 
and a consolidated approach.  Several drafts of the security policy were sent out to 
various members of Colombian society for feedback and critique.  Comments and 
opinions were received from intellectuals, academics, private sector representatives and 
from many other walks of life.73  They also used feedback from the regional security 
councils regularly held by the President.  This allowed feedback from the local and 
regional governments “who suffer first hand the effects of terrorism and insecurity.”74 
Defense Minister Ramirez says this of the process used to develop the Democratic 
Security and Defense Policy: 
This represents a radical change.  We Colombians have long thought that 
citizens’ security was a problem for the National Police and the Armed 
Forces.  For years there was a great vacuum in the activity of other state 
institutions in some critical areas of our geography and our democracy.  It 
is precisely that vacuum that explains the growth of the drugs business and 
consequently of the terrorist organizations in large areas of our country.  
That is why the achievement of complete state territorial control, so as to 
guarantee the rule of law and democratic governance, is one of the pillars 
of this policy.75 
It is evident that the Government of Colombia realizes the need for interagency and 
interdepartmental coordination and integration to ensure effective implementation of the 
policy.  They realize that it is not just a military problem, but a problem that involves 
every one of the government’s institutions.  The Colombian government has also realized 
that in order to be successful, continuity of the policy will be necessary over a long 
period of time.76 
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“The general objective of the Democratic Security and Defense Policy is to 
strengthen and guarantee the rule of law throughout Colombia, through the reinforcement 
of democratic authority.”77  The policy stresses the importance of territorial control and 
coordinated actions of all the institutions of the state.  Another important facet of the 
policy is the emphasis on the proper functioning of the judicial system.  Dr. Luz E. Nagle 
a former judge in Medellin, Colombia (and now a law professor in the United States 
because of repeated assassination attempts in Colombia) is extremely critical of the 
judicial and legal system in her homeland.  In her work, The Search for Accountability 
and Transparency in Plan Colombia: Reforming Judicial Institutions—Again, she says, 
“One of the most important priorities of Plan Colombia is to strengthen the nation’s 
judicial institutions, since so much of the survival of Colombia is dependent on the 
judiciary’s ability to reimpose the rule of law while protecting the rights and enforcing 
the obligations of both citizens and foreign investment.”78  The Democratic Security and 
Defense Policy addresses many of the issues that Dr. Nagle points out as critical 
problems in her work.  Only time will tell if the reforms instituted by the policy will 
succeed. 
E. SIX COURSES OF ACTION 
The cornerstones of the Democratic Security and Defense Policy are the six 
courses of action designed to fulfill the strategic objectives of the policy.  The six courses 
of action are: coordinating state action, strengthening state institutions, consolidating 
control of national territory, protecting the rights of all Colombians and the nation’s 
infrastructure, cooperating for the security of all, and communicating state policy and 
action.  All of the following information is taken from the Democratic Security and 
Defense Policy:79 
1. Coordinating State Action 
In this area, the policy addresses what is termed perhaps the most critical area 
affecting state response to citizens’ security—lack of effective coordination between state 
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institutions.  The policy establishes the National Defense and Security Council which will 
be the forum where the President will liaise with his ministers, the armed forces, and the 
national police.  The council will issue directives, supervise the implementation of each, 
and evaluate the results.  Regional authorities will also set up similar councils at the local 
level to ensure policy implementation down to the most local level possible.  The policy 
also establishes a Joint Intelligence Committee to coordinate among the state’s 
intelligence services.  The idea is to consolidate strategic level intelligence, eliminate 
interagency turf battles, and eliminate redundancy.  Again, regional intelligence 
committees will be set up at local levels to accomplish the same tasks down at the local 
level.  The policy places the Ministry of Defense as the lead agency for implementing and 
coordinating the Democratic Security and Defense Policy.  The Ministry of Defense is 
also put in charge of logistics and resources for implementing the policy.  Interagency 
support structures will also be established to coordinate and facilitate the work of 
regional and local state bodies and judicial authorities.  These structures also provide a 
mechanism to ensure that the justice system is effective, remains within the law, and 
upholds human rights. 
2. Strengthening State Institutions 
The major component of the policy here is to overhaul and strengthen the judicial 
system, the armed forces, the national police, intelligence, and state finances. Judicial 
reforms include amending the constitution to aid in the fight against violent crimes such 
as homicide and kidnapping.  The country’s prisons will be upgraded and improved.  
Probably most important among the judicial reforms will be reform of the public 
prosecutors office and providing better access to Casas de Justicia y Paz for those who 
live in rural and remote areas.  Armed forces reforms include professionalization of the 
military and reform of compulsory military service.  Colombian law used to exempt 
anyone with a high school education or higher from combat.  This left fighting primarily 
up to the poor and uneducated peasant classes.  The policy changes that law to not 
exempt those with a higher education from combat service.  The policy also allocates 
more and better resources to the armed forces.  The strengthening of the national police 
includes: extending coverage to more municipalities, increase of patrols in rural areas, the 
creation of new mobile Carabinero Squadrons, building and fortifying rural police 
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stations, strengthening the highway police, creating  regular auxiliaries, and promoting 
the work of and collaboration with civic police.  The strengthening of intelligence 
includes not only the creation of the Joint Intelligence Committee mentioned earlier, but 
the strengthening of all intelligence apparatus at the strategic, operational, and tactical 
level.  The horizontal exchange of information between agencies and the emphasis on 
counterintelligence capability is also delineated.  A major problem in Colombia is 
collection of taxes and the policy seeks to correct this issue.  A referendum and tax 
reforms as well as an effort to minimize duplication of effort at all levels of the 
government is meant to boost the financial stature of the government.  Severe penalties 
for tax evasion will be imposed as well as the strengthening of the National Customs and 
Taxation Directorate to enforce tax collection. 
3. Consolidating Control of National Territory 
“Consolidating state control over the country will be a gradual but continuous 
process of containing, dismantling and deterring the illegal armed groups, protecting the 
population, and reestablishing the authority of democratic institutions.  The idea is to 
create a virtuous circle of long term recovery and consolidation which will gradually 
restore an atmosphere of security throughout the country.”  The emphasis is on the 
recovery, maintenance, and consolidation of state control over territory where there is no 
state presence.  An integrated plan for border security, urban security, and the elimination 
of the illegal narcotics trafficking trade is also discussed.  The framework of dealing with 
the narcotics issue relies on the revamped state institutions such as the armed forces, 
National Police, and judicial system. 
4. Protecting the Rights of Colombians and the Nation’s Infrastructure 
“The basic mechanism for protecting the lives and rights of Colombian citizens is 
the strengthening of the rule of law over Colombian territory.”  The policy also identifies 
“persons at risk” such as, mayors, councilors, community leaders, political activists, 
journalists, and human rights activists that may require special attention.  The policy 
discusses victims of forced displacement due to the illegal armed groups in Colombia and 
programs to restore lost land to peoples who were wrongfully stripped of their land by 
these illegally armed groups.  The problems of terrorism, kidnapping, and extortion are 
also discussed in this section.  Again, the framework to achieve these objectives is the 
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strengthening of the state’s institutions and by establishing public confidence and faith in 
those institutions.  The problem of child combatant demobilization and protection against 
the recruitment of children and adolescents into the ranks of the illegally armed groups is 
also addressed.  The government has invited all combatants, child and adult alike, the 
opportunity to lay down their arms.  Every effort will be made to reintegrate former 
combatants back into society.  Protection of the economic infrastructure is detailed.  The 
importance of the protection of coal, electricity, oil and telecommunications 
infrastructure, as well as ports and airport is stressed.  The armed forces and police forces 
are given the charge of protecting these vital areas.  The Government Road Security 
Program is introduced here and its aim is to guarantee the safe passage for all passengers 
and goods on Colombia’s highways. 
5. Cooperating for the Security of All 
The security of solidarity, cooperation networks, and reward programs will be 
established to encourage the voluntary and patriotic cooperation of Colombian citizens.  
Regional security committees will be established which will enlist the support of civil 
society to prevent and punish crimes.  Cooperation networks will be established both in 
urban and rural areas to help provide authorities information about crimes and to help in 
the pursuit of criminals.  In essence, it will function like a “neighborhood watch” 
program.  A monetary reward program will be set up to reward those who provide 
information leading to the prevention of a terrorist attack or the arrest of members of any 
of the illegally armed groups.  The same incentives shall exist for those who provide 
information about illegal narcotics traffickers.  The need for international cooperation is 
also discussed.  The policy recognizes the need to get regional actors as well as other 
affected international actors involved in increasing security.  After all, it is not just 
Colombia that has a stake in this issue.  The fight against terrorism and illegal narcotics 
trafficking is a problem that plagues just about every country in the world.   
6. Communicating State Policy and Action 
 “Terrorism is a form of political violence which uses communication to spread 
fear and terror in both urban and rural areas.  Terrorist action reflects neither military nor 
political strength, but rather the weakness of those who do not have the support of the 
people and try to impose their will through terror.  It is an empty strength.  The 
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government will keep the public fully informed of developments in all areas relating to 
the Defense and Democratic Security Policy in order to boost confidence and encourage 
citizen cooperation and solidarity.”  The policy calls not only on the government for the 
responsible handling of information, but the media as well.  It implores the media to use 
restraint when releasing information that may endanger lives or jeopardize operations.  
“The government, through its Foreign Service and military and police attachés, will 
undertake an exercise in public diplomacy to explain the nature of the Colombian 
problem in its Latin American, hemispheric and international context.  Above all, 
Colombia requires strong institutions which will fill the vacuum of authority, protect the 
population, guarantee their rights, reduce poverty and allow the economy to prosper.” 
F.  ASSESSMENT OF OBJECTIVES 
Dr. Thomas A. Marks, in his monograph Sustainability of Colombian 
Military/Strategic Support for “Democratic Security,” says the following about President 
Uribe’s Democratic Security and Defense Policy: 
Upon taking office in August 2002, President Alvaro Uribe Velez of 
Colombia was faced with a difficult strategic situation that required a fresh 
approach.  This was forthcoming in a Democratic Security and Defense 
Policy which radically reoriented the state posture towards its principal 
security challenge—an insurgency inextricably linked to the narcotics 
trade and other criminal activity.  Previously committed to negotiation, the 
government opted for counterinsurgency.  Though multifaceted in its 
dimensions, the new policy effectively assigned the cutting edge role to 
the Colombian armed forces (COLMIL), most prominently the dominant 
service, the army (COLAR).  This required that the forces aggressively 
pursue a well-funded, entrenched adversary within a complex international 
environment decidedly hostile to state efforts at stability operations.  This 
they have done in impressive fashion.80 
As noted previously, President Uribe was fortunate that Colombia’s military forces had 
already begun the transformation process to better handle counterinsurgency while 
President Pastrana was still in office.  Thus, Uribe inherited a military already on the way 
to becoming an effective counterinsurgency force.81 
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The military recognized the need to reorganize and reorient itself.  “They had 
crafted their approach based upon the neutralization of FARC’s strategy, even as they 
instituted a far-reaching and comprehensive military reform process that affected 
everything from recruiting (a largely draftee COLAR became one-third volunteer, with 
key units essentially 100 percent “professionals”), to military schooling, to assignment 
policies, to structure, to operational art.  The result was a reclaiming of the strategic 
initiative by the Uribe advent.”82  The adaptation of the Colombian military coupled with 
the President Uribe’s strategic guidance and leadership has resulted in improved 
conditions in Colombia.  Dr. Stephen Marks says, “The overall picture then, is one of a 
dramatically improved security environment.  This has seen improvement in other 
indicators, the very intent of the Democratic Security and Defense Policy.”83 
Dr. Marks believes that Uribe’s strategic framework is both “correct and 
sustainable,” but long term success will depend on many variables.84  There is no doubt 
that the insurgents will continue to use violence as long as possible and violence may 
actually increase in response to the state’s efforts.  What is crucial is patience and 
adaptability to the ebbs and flows that are common to internal wars.  Marks cautions 
about the difficulties democracies face in waging a successful counterinsurgency.  The 
protracted nature of successful counterinsurgency campaigns and the disagreements that 
often emerge about strategic ends and means make it difficult to sustain a coherent 
national effort.85   
Another factor which makes sustaining successful counterinsurgency campaigns 
difficult is finding successful measures of effectiveness (MOE).  It is important to 
understand that certain statistics may be a misleading MOE.  For example, the “body 
count” metric made famous during America’s involvement in Vietnam is certainly not a 
good measure.  This MOE is analogous to the U.S. government’s metric of hectares of 
coca plants destroyed.  You can count bodies and hectares of drug crops destroyed, but 
what ultimately matters is whether or not the insurgency continues and whether illegal                                                  
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narcotics are still readily available.  “Progress, then, ends up being a state of popular 
mind, a belief upon the part of the populace (and its leaders) that the situation is 
improving.”86  Marks believes this state of mind currently exists in Colombia thanks to 
Uribe and the actions of his administration. 
The Democratic Security and Defense Policy has had positive effects in 
Colombia.  Uribe astutely realized the need for a long-term strategic plan to restore 
security and democracy in a country torn by decades of insurgency and violence.  Uribe 
is correct in his belief that security from the local to the highest levels is the necessary 
basis for restoring control and order.  Luckily, the military and national police have 
stepped up to the daunting task and so far have adapted well.  Dr. Stephen Marks, says: 
What bears repeating is the point to which this analysis has returned often: 
the present effort is both correct and sustainable.  It is the strategic posture 
required for progress and popular security.  Hence continued care must be 
exercised to ensure that Democratic Security remains a multifaceted 
approach, a strengthening of the state—of its governance and finances—
and of democratic capacity.  These are carried out behind the ever more 
powerful and capable shield provided by the security forces.  But they 
only enable the solution, which lies in the use of legitimacy to mobilize 
response against those using political violence to seek illegitimate ends.87 
Marks is heavily in favor of Uribe’s actions under the Democratic Security and 
Defense Policy, but Uribe does have his critics as well.  Some critics argue that Uribe has 
overemphasized “security” and “defense” at the expense of “democracy.”  Nobody 
refutes that personal security has increased and violence has shown a sharp decline in 
recent years due to Uribe’s measures.  It is argued that these improved conditions may 
only be temporary adjustments and the only true test will be steady progress measured 
over several years.  Certainly one of the greatest benefits of the recent changes in 
Colombia has been the change in attitude of Colombians’ towards the conflict.  Many 
people feel that Uribe is finally tackling the problem head-on and the country is more 
secure as a result.88  Peoples’ perceptions about the conflict are changing and in an 
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insurgency that has lasted for over forty years, this change in attitude in itself is 
important.  Uribe still faces mounting criticism over human rights issues and violations.89  
He will have to deal with the human rights issues if he is to be effective. 
Other observers of the situation in Colombia say the Democratic Security and 
Defense Policy, is the first necessary step in the right direction, but insufficient.  Ann 
Mason in her article Colombia’s Democratic Security Agenda, says that Uribe’s efforts 
will only be effective when his agenda reaches all facets of the of the institutional 
foundation of the state.90  Mason believes progress must be made toward severing the 
links between the state’s security forces and the paramilitary organizations.  She also 
believes the policy places too much emphasis on counterterrorism and not enough on the 
fact this is actually an internal conflict.  Mason goes on to say that Uribe must 
incorporate and engage a broader segment of civil society such as the Catholic Church, 
the NGO community, business, union leaders, and political parties.91  Colombia does 
indeed need to institutionalize the change begun under the Democratic Security and 
Defense Policy throughout all facets of the state and society over the long term.   
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IV. CASE STUDIES OF LATIN AMERICAN INSURGENCIES 
A. INTRODUCTION TO CASE STUDIES 
Experiences and lessons learned from insurgencies in other countries can be 
beneficial to understanding the current situation in Colombia and resolving its ongoing 
insurgency.  Peru’s Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path) movement and El Salvador’s 
struggle against the Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation, or FMLN, are two 
excellent cases that could prove useful in resolving the situation in Colombia.  Though 
the insurgencies that ravaged these two Latin American countries (Peru and El Salvador) 
share parallels with Colombia, care must be taken not to extrapolate directly from one 
situation and apply it directly to Colombia, or vice versa.  The situation in each of these 
countries is unique enough that a careful study of the all of the causal factors of the 
insurgencies in each respective country is necessary to fully comprehend the complexities 
of each situation. 
The intent of the case studies of Peru and El Salvador is not to analyze the 
situations in these two countries down to the minutest detail, but to look for similarities 
and valuable lessons learned.  Not every observation will be applicable to Colombia; in 
fact many may not be applicable due to the uniqueness of the situations in each of the 
countries.  What may also emerge is a “how not to” instead of a “how to” approach as a 
result of the case analyses.  Peru and El Salvador were chosen obviously because they are 
Latin American countries, but also because they offer a glimpse at different methods of 
dealing with the insurgents.  These two cases also offer a contrast in U.S. involvement.  
In El Salvador, the U.S. was heavily engaged with both economic and military aid.  In 
Peru, the U.S. had limited involvement in combating the insurgents. 
B.  THE REVOLUTION IN EL SALVADOR 
The roots of the revolutions during the twentieth century in many Latin American 
countries can be traced back to popular claims for social justice and the more equitable 
distribution of wealth and power.  Colombia and El Salvador are no exception.  
Colombia’s troubles erupted during the period of La Violencia which was discussed 
earlier and simmered throughout the 1960s when the FARC was founded.  El Salvador’s 
guerrilla groups gained strength and prominence in the 1970s following a four decade 
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period of military rule and oppression.  Like Colombia, El Salvador had many guerrilla 
groups with differing links to communist ideology.  Realizing strength in numbers would 
be beneficial, the guerilla groups merged to form the Farabundo Martí National 
Liberation Front (FMLN).92  Like the FARC in Colombia, the FMLN emerged as the 
strongest revolutionary group in El Salvador and the main threat to the existence of the 
state. 
In El Salvador, economic and political factors fed the revolutionary appetite of a 
disenfranchised peasantry.  The growing economic disparity between the lower class 
peasants and the ruling landed-elite fed the discontent evident throughout the 1970s and 
1980s. It is interesting to note that a great many of the revolutionary guerrilla leaders 
were (ex-)students from universities and were from middle class families.93 A 
revolutionary consciousness emerged in the universities during this period.  This was a 
phenomenon not exclusive to El Salvador, it occurred in many universities throughout the 
world.  Violent overthrow of the oppressive government was promoted by these 
university students committed to Communist ideology. The Salvadoran military only 
added to the growing tensions in the country.  The military had long been under the 
control of the elite ruling class in El Salvador and was often used to brutally suppress any 
opposition to the government.  The military was often accused of “death-squad” tactics to 
crush opposition.  For the most part, the military enjoyed immunity from prosecution for 
the wrongdoings of which many of its members were accused.   
Another factor which disrupted the status quo in El Salvador was the influence of 
the Catholic Church in El Salvador, particularly the teachings of the Jesuits.  The Church 
in El Salvador became an influential advocate of political and economic change in 
Salvadoran society.  Many members of the clergy were outspoken critics of the 
government and condemned its oppressive methods.  The clergy fought for reforms in 
favor of the working class and supported the right of the peasants to organize themselves 
to demand better wages and working conditions.94  This brought down the anger of the 
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government and the oligarchy upon the clergy.  Many members of the clergy were 
intimidated, arrested, tortured, and murdered by henchmen of the government and 
oligarchy.  This attack on the clergy also included the assassination of Archbishop Oscar 
Arnulfo Romero in March of 1980.95 
In late 1979, a “reformist” coup was incited by officers in the Salvadoran 
Military. “But the underlying purpose of its main organizers was to preempt leftist 
revolution by breaking the domination of a narrow landed oligarchy and incorporating 
democratic politicians and parties into a reformed political system alongside forward-
looking representatives of the capitalist class.”96  Ultimately the Salvadoran military was 
severely weakened by the coup because the traditional symbiotic relationship with the 
landowning class had been broken.  The military was now divided into two factions, 
those who were “reformists” and supported the coup and those who still supported the old 
connections to the landed oligarchy.97  The coup also weakened the government and 
resistance grew amongst the guerrilla factions now united under the FMLN umbrella.  In 
1981, the guerrillas planned a “final offensive” to oust the government, but failed to do 
so.98  The Reagan administration, having just recently taken office, realized the weakness 
and vulnerability of the Salvadoran government and quickly renewed economic and 
military aid.  U.S. aid and elections in El Salvador lent legitimacy to the government and 
in 1984 peace talks with the guerrillas were initiated.  Unfortunately the peace talks failed 
to produce results. 
In 1984, José Napoleón Duarte was elected president of El Salvador.  He was the 
first civilian president of El Salvador in fifty-three years.  “The Duarte years began with 
hope and ended with frustration for the president and his supporters.”99  The war 
worsened during his administration and the economy also continued its decline.  One 
positive development during Duarte’s administration was the sharp decline in human 
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rights abuses perpetrated by the government, mainly the military.  In December 1983, 
Vice President Bush visited El Salvador and threatened to suspend U.S. aid if the human 
rights abuses committed by the government did not stop.100  Discontent with the Duarte 
administration and his Christian Democrat (PDC) party led to the emergence of the right-
wing Alianza Republicana Nacionalista (ARENA) party as the most powerful political 
entity in the 1989 elections. 
The ARENA party presidential candidate was U.S.-educated, Alfredo Cristiani.  
On June 1, 1989, Cristiani took the oath of office and assumed the presidency of El 
Salvador.101  Two days after assuming office, Cristiani proposed peace talks with the 
FMLN and representatives from both sides met in Mexico in mid-September to discuss 
procedures for the negotiations.102  Subsequent talks were held in Costa Rica and the 
government demanded a complete cessation of hostilities, but was unable to provide 
guarantees concerning the safety of the insurgents.  Other meetings were scheduled for 
November in Venezuela, but an attack attributed to government forces, on the 
headquarters of El Salvador’s largest and most militant trade union (FENESTRAS), 
killed its secretary general and nine others.103  This attack convinced the FMLN that the 
government was not serious about negotiations and in November launched a nationwide 
offensive that took the war to the capital, San Salvador, for the first time. 
This second “final offensive” launched by the FMLN in November 1989 did not 
topple the government as was planned, but did achieve other lasting results.  It exposed 
the weakness and vulnerability of the government and its forces.  The offensive also 
showed that despite having the capability to mount such an attack, the FMLN lacked the 
strength to fully overthrow the government.  A key event during the offensive was the 
murder of six Jesuit priest-scholars, their housekeeper and her daughter on the grounds of 
the Jesuit-run Central American University.  The murders were carried out by a 
Salvadoran army unit which had been trained by U.S. military advisers.104  “This single 
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act [the murders] would have an impact both within and beyond El Salvador that was at 
least as great as the offensive itself.”105 
The murders and the offensive caused many members of the U.S. Congress to 
question funding and aid provided to El Salvador.  International scrutiny over the 
situation in El Salvador also increased with pressure being placed on the Salvadoran 
government to negotiate a settlement with the FMLN.  U.S. aid to El Salvador was 
eventually reduced and peace negotiations continued between the FMLN and the 
government of El Salvador throughout 1990 and 1991.  On January 16, 1992, the 
Salvadoran peace accords were signed during a ceremony in Mexico City.  “The final 
accords reduced the size of the Armed Forces; limited their role to territorial security; 
revised the education of officers and provided for the purification of the officer corps; 
eliminated the three security forces and replaced them with the PNC [National Civilian 
Police]; provided for judicial and electoral reforms; and addressed economic and social 
issues.”106 
U.S. involvement in El Salvador has received mixed reviews; however the 
ultimate outcome of the conflict was a negotiated settlement.  Four U.S. Army Lieutenant 
Colonels, studying as National Security Fellows at the Kennedy School of Government, 
analyzed U.S. involvement in El Salvador and wrote a report entitled, American Military 
Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador.107  In this report, the authors are largely 
critical of U.S. actions in El Salvador.  The article was written in 1988 which was prior to 
the negotiated settlement in 1992, yet they capture the crux of U.S. involvement in El 
Salvador.   
El Salvador represented one of the longest U.S. military involvements since 
Vietnam to that date (throughout most of the 1980’s and early 1990’s).  Congressionally 
capped at a level of fifty five trainers, the U.S. undertook a massive effort to transform 
and reorganize the Salvadoran armed forces from an organization which was on the verge 
of being defeated by the FMLN to one capable of combating the insurgents.  The initial                                                  
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U.S. efforts in El Salvador were aimed at just preventing collapse.108  The government 
was so weak and the military so inept, a victory by the FMLN seemed inevitable.  The 
investment of U.S. money and training did enhance the capabilities of the Salvadoran 
military.  “Structurally, ESAF [El Salvadoran Armed Forces] emerged as a force better 
suited for conventional war than for counterinsurgency.  To be sure, tactical air support, 
heavy weapons, and battalion-size operations helped ESAF turn the tide in the war’s 
early desperate phase.”109 
American efforts to reform the Salvadoran military only went so far.  The U.S. 
was effective at drastically reducing “death squad” activity and reducing overt military 
intervention in the Salvadoran political process.110  The U.S. was not as successful in its 
attempts to foster a more professional culture within the Salvadoran officer and NCO 
corps.111  The military was now more capable, but the cultural changes which the U.S. 
advisers wished to institute in the Salvadoran military would not prove to have a short-
term solution.  The American advisers involved in El Salvador quickly realized the 
solution to the Salvadoran problem was not strictly military.  Civic actions, civil defense, 
psychological operations coupled with a coherent program of social and economic reform 
were necessary elements of a long-term solution. 
Despite the shortcomings and difficulties of U.S. involvement, the end result was 
a negotiated settlement between the rebels and the Salvadoran government.  The rebels 
were not capable of violently overthrowing the government and the government was not 
able to completely suppress the insurgency.  It was undoubtedly the massive U.S. 
assistance which kept the Salvadoran government from imploding during the insurgency.  
El Salvador, despite recurrent elections still struggles with the persistence of the upper 
class and military heavily involved in the political process.112 
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C.  COMPARISON OF COLOMBIA AND EL SALVADOR 
As was stated in the introduction to this section, it is difficult to translate 
experiences from one country and apply them to another.  The societal, cultural, political, 
economic, and myriad other differences truly make each situation unique.  Still, there are 
lessons to be learned from the situation in El Salvador capable of application to 
Colombia.  A comparison of the major differences between the situations in the two 
countries will provide a useful frame of reference when considering the lessons learned in 
El Salvador. 
A striking difference between the two countries is size.  Both geographic and 
population size are drastically greater for Colombia.  Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) 
factbook data for 2005 lists the population of Colombia at 42,954,297 and El Salvador at 
6,704,932.  Land mass for Colombia is 1,038,700 square kilometers and El Salvador is 
20,720 square kilometers.113  To put this in perspective, El Salvador is just slightly 
smaller than the state of Massachusetts and Colombia is just slightly smaller than three 
times the size of the state of Montana.  El Salvador has one of the highest population 
densities in all of Latin America while Colombia enjoys a much lower population 
density.  Using the 2005 numbers, Colombia has roughly 41 people per square kilometer 
versus roughly 323 people per square kilometer in El Salvador.  Granted, the urban areas 
of both countries have much greater population densities than their respective rural areas.  
The numbers are just used to illustrate that it is probably much easier for Colombian 
insurgents to hide in the vast and sparsely populated rural areas of Colombia than it was 
for Salvadoran rebels to hide in a country slightly smaller than Massachusetts.  
Expanding and enforcing government control over these vast areas is obviously more of a 
challenge in Colombia especially due to the extreme ruggedness of its mountainous and 
jungle regions.  It is in precisely these regions where the insurgents exist and thrive. 
Another striking difference is the makeup and background of the guerilla leaders 
in each country.  As previously mentioned the leaders of the FMLN in El Salvador were 
mostly from the universities and came from middle and upper-class backgrounds.  These 
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revolutionary leaders then sought out support from the peasantry in the rural areas.  In 
Colombia, especially for the FARC, the same guiding principle does not apply to the 
leaders of the insurgency.  “Colombia always provides a special case in one key regard: 
For the FARC guerrillas—largest of the three sixties’ groups—it is highly misleading to 
speak of urban, upper-class guerrillas trying to establish rapport with rural, lower-class 
peasants.”114  The FARC always had and continues to maintain leadership from the 
peasant lower-classes.  Wickham-Crowley in his book, Guerrillas & Revolution in Latin 
America, says, “This theme recurs throughout this book because I must make very clear 
that the guerrillas and peasants typically came from profoundly different ‘social worlds,’ 
which made highly problematic the formation of ‘bridges’ between those worlds.”115 
Violence is certainly prevalent in Colombia and El Salvador; however it seems to 
be more widely accepted and prominent in Colombian culture.  There is even an epoch 
aptly named La Violencia which claimed over 200,000 lives in Colombia during the 
1940s and 50s.116  Colombia consistently ranks at or near the top of countries in the 
world for most violent crimes.  Colombia ranks first in the world for murders per capita 
and kidnappings.  It ranks second in the world for murders with firearms.117  Gabriel 
Marcella in his monograph, The United States and Colombia: The Journey from 
Ambiguity to Strategic Clarity, says the following about violence in Colombia: “The 
amount of violent crime is extraordinary.  Colombia’s homicide rate is three times higher 
than in Brazil and Mexico and ten times the rate of the United States and Argentina.  
Moreover, some 60 percent of all the kidnappings in the world take place in 
Colombia.”118  Marcella goes on to quote Colombian General Enrique Mora as saying, 
“We Colombians have historically accepted living with violence.”119  This propensity for 
violence may help explain why the insurgency has festered for over four decades.  
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Inextricably linked with the violence in Colombia is perhaps the greatest 
difference between the situations in Colombia and El Salvador.  This difference is the 
pervasiveness of narcotrafficking and other crimes perpetrated by the insurgents in 
Colombia.  The Salvadoran rebels received support from countries such as Nicaragua, 
Cuba, and the Soviet Union.  The Colombian rebels fund themselves through 
narcotrafficking, kidnapping, extortion, and other crimes.  As previously mentioned, the 
estimates of revenue brought in by the Colombian insurgents via illicit means are 
astounding with figures reaching several hundred million dollars in annual income.  In El 
Salvador, the rebels needed and actively sought out support from peasants in the rural 
regions and resorted to force when necessary.  In Colombia, the insurgents coerce, extort, 
or just pay for support as necessary.  The lines between the narcotraffickers and 
insurgents have blurred.  It seems the guerrillas began their associations with the drug 
traffickers in the 1970s.  This “marriage made in hell” began with the guerrillas initially 
furnishing security and transporting illegal drugs for the emerging drug cartels.120  Now 
it is increasing difficult to distinguish between the guerrillas and the narcotics traffickers 
with the insurgents involved in every facet of the illegal drug trade. 
Joseph R. Nuñez writes about the “Hobbesian Trinity” that plagues Colombia and 
complicates any attempt to resolve the ongoing dilemma.  This unholy trinity is 
comprised of the guerrillas, the paramilitaries, and the narcotraffickers.121  In El Salvador 
there was just the FMLN against the state.  In Colombia there exist the two major leftist 
insurgent groups (FARC and ELN); the right-wing paramilitary organization (AUC), 
which emerged as a direct result of the state not being able to provide security throughout 
the country against the leftist groups; and the narcotraffickers. These additional actors 
only serve to complicate an already complex situation.  Any attempt at negotiations or 
demobilization must include all of the major combatant actors in Colombia which are the 
FARC, ELN, and AUC.  One of the major problems impeding success in Colombia is the 
blurring of lines between the ranks of the FARC, ELN, AUC, and the narcotraffickers.  
All of the major combatant groups have been linked to narcotrafficking. 
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D.  LESSONS LEARNED 
Despite the differences between Colombia and El Salvador, there are lessons to be 
learned from the insurgency in El Salvador that can be applied to Colombia.  Judging 
from President Uribe’s actions taken under the auspices of the Democratic Security and 
Defense Policy, it appears Colombia is applying most of the lessons which will be 
discussed shortly.  Unfortunately, it appears the United States is myopically focused on 
the counternarcotics side of the problem in Colombia, though it has recently loosened the 
reins to allow some monies to be used for “counterterrorist” activities.122  This will be 
dealt with in more detail in the final chapter as well as conclusions and recommendations 
for both governments. 
First and foremost of the lessons learned is that the insurgency must be fought and 
won by people and state of the applicable country.  The U.S. provided a great deal of 
monetary and military support to El Salvador, but ultimately it was the Salvadorans 
themselves who brought about the end of the conflict.  This also applies to Colombia in 
that the U.S. is providing vast amounts of aid also in the form of monetary and military.  
As previously mentioned, with the exception of some money and training allowed to be 
used for “counterterrorism” purposes, most of the aid is earmarked for counternarcotics 
efforts.  President Uribe realizes that combating the insurgency is the responsibility of all 
Colombians.  In the introduction to the Democratic Security and Defense Policy he says, 
“Security is not achieved simply through the efforts of the Armed Forces and the 
National Police. This is an effort of the entire State and of all Colombians.”123 
Another lesson is that some form of negotiations with the combatants will be 
necessary.  There will be a measure of give and take on all sides with all of the 
participants.  In El Salvador, several attempts at negotiations were made throughout the 
conflict with many only providing a brief cessation to hostilities.  It was not until the 
peace accords of 1992 were signed that major hostilities ended in El Salvador.  The 
government of El Salvador was forced to make political concessions to the guerrillas and 
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institute the reforms previously mentioned, namely reform of the military.  President 
Uribe has “left the door open to negotiations with those who opt for democratic politics, 
provided they agree to a strictly enforced cease-fire.”124   
What led to the negotiated settlement in El Salvador was essentially a military 
stalemate.  Neither side was able to achieve a decisive victory over the other and in the 
interest of self-preservation, each party decided negotiations were in their best interests.  
We saw that the attempts at negotiations with the FARC in Colombia failed during the 
Pastrana administration, because the FARC was not really interested in a real negotiated 
settlement.  The FARC used the zona de despeje which was conceded to it by the 
Pastrana administration as a base from which to launch attacks and further strengthen its 
power and reach in Colombia.  Negotiations with the insurgents in Colombia will not be 
possible until the insurgents realize it is in their best interests to negotiate.  As long as the 
insurgents feel that their existence is not threatened, they will not feel a need to negotiate.  
The Colombian government and people must make the insurgents believe that armed 
struggle is futile and self-defeating.  In addition to Uribe’s “open door” policy for 
negotiations, the Colombian government must deliver on promises of political voice and 
personal safety for the demobilized combatants.  Events like the assassinations of 
politically left leaders and politicians which took place in the 1980s would only serve to 
plunge Colombia back into the turmoil from which it is trying to emerge.  The issue of 
negotiations will be dealt with in more depth in the final chapter. 
Ernest Evans, a frequent contributor to World Affairs journal, wrote an article 
entitled, El Salvador’s lessons for future U.S. interventions.125  In the article, he lists five 
major lessons to be learned from the U.S. involvement in El Salvador.  The lessons are: 
1. The El Salvadoran civil war demonstrated that in counterinsurgency 
campaigns allowing the foreign and local military and security personnel 
to engage in human rights violations such as the torture and killing of 
prisoners is totally counterproductive. 
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2. U.S. support for the democratization of El Salvador proved to be a plus in 
combating the FMLN. 
3. The El Salvadoran war shows that in combating an insurgency it is wise to 
keep the number of foreign troops to a minimum. 
4. If an outside power such as the United States wants to have any significant 
impact on an internal conflict like the El Salvadoran civil war, it must be 
prepared to undertake a long-term intervention. 
5. Even in conflicts like El Salvador, where the United States is able and 
willing to sustain a long-term military intervention, there are very real 
limitations on what such an intervention can accomplish. 
These lessons apply not only to policymakers in the U.S. and members of its armed 
forces; they apply to the Colombian government and military prosecuting the 
counterinsurgency.   
Evans’ first point is already drawing international scrutiny towards Colombia.  
Non-governmental human rights watchdog groups have criticized the U.S. State 
Department for certifying that the Colombian government is making progress with regard 
to human rights despite their own (State Department) human rights reports which point to 
collusion between some members of the Colombian security forces and the right-wing 
paramilitary groups (AUC).126  The importance of respecting and upholding human 
rights is addressed in the Democratic Security and Defense Policy.  It says, “The 
strengthening of the rule of law requires not only effective institutions, active citizen 
participation and the prevalence of judicial norms which guarantee rights and liberties; it 
also requires the government to act in accordance with the law.”127  The U.S. government 
needs to verify Colombian compliance with mandated human rights provisions and 
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withdraw support if evidence is found supporting the watchdog groups’ allegations.  As 
previously mentioned, human rights abuses were sharply curtailed in El Salvador after 
Vice President Bush visited in 1983 and threatened to suspend aid if the abuses by 
Salvadoran security forces did not cease. Colombia will never be able to establish 
legitimacy in the eyes of its citizens and the international community without addressing 
and solving the human rights dilemma. 
The lesson of democratization that Evans mentions is valid in Colombia as well.  
President Uribe addresses the issue throughout the Democratic Security and Defense 
Policy.  The challenge for Colombia is instituting and restoring democracy to the regions 
where the illegally armed groups have eroded or replaced the legitimate authority of the 
state.  Colombia is one of the oldest democracies in the Western hemisphere, but the 
inability of the state to provide effective security and control throughout its territory has 
limited democratic practices.  The demobilized combatants must also be afforded the 
same guarantee of safety and democracy that is afforded to regular citizens.  The 
assassinations of leftist political party members and leaders like those which occurred 
during the 1980s when the FARC established a political front called the Patriotic Union 
(UP), only undermines democracy.128  A truly democratic Colombia with fair political 
representation will serve to discredit and undercut the legitimacy of the insurgents. 
Minimizing the number of foreign troops (namely U.S. forces) fighting in 
Colombia also rings true.  The caution applies to the host nation becoming over reliant on 
U.S. forces and essentially using them as a “crutch.”  In Vietnam, after the U.S. 
withdrew, the South Vietnamese were incapable of defending themselves without U.S. 
assistance. This was one of the main reasons that the limit of fifty five military personnel 
was placed on U.S. involvement in El Salvador. The same sort of public and political 
sentiment that prevented widespread U.S. participation in El Salvador exists today for 
U.S. involvement in Colombia.  The U.S. involvement in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the 
Global War on Terror has the military occupied and politicians leery of committing more 
U.S. troops in another country.  Still, the numbers of congressionally authorized U.S. 
military and contractors is considerably higher in Colombia than it was in El Salvador.  In 
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2004, Congress doubled the number of authorized U.S. troops on Colombian soil from 
400 to 800 and increased the number of authorized U.S. contractors from 400 to 600.129  
Without consideration to the respective population size of Colombia and El Salvador, this 
represents a significant higher number of American troops in Colombia versus the fifty 
five authorized in El Salvador. The majority of U.S. personnel however, are dedicated to 
the counternarcotics side of the equation. 
There is no doubt that a long-term commitment to solving the situation in 
Colombia is necessary.  The insurgency has continued for over four decades despite 
numerous attempts at reaching a military or negotiated solution.  The insurgents are 
obviously committed to a long-term approach and to successfully counter them, the 
government of Colombia and the United States must also be committed to the same.  
More importantly, the peoples of Colombia and the United States must be willing to 
undertake a long-term commitment.  Ernest Evans points out in his article, “As a people, 
Americans tend to be impatient and are quickly frustrated with long, drawn-out wars.”130  
Evans points to the increase in capability and ability of the Salvadoran forces to turn back 
the insurgents during the 1989 offensive as a result of the nearly ten year effort of 
advising, training, and equipping by U.S. forces.  This is the sort of long-haul effort 
required to be successful in a counterinsurgency. 
Evans last lesson points to the fact that the governments of Colombia, the United 
States, and the militaries of both countries need to realize the limits and limitations of a 
long-term military intervention.  This is worth emphasizing because history has shown 
that successful counterinsurgencies have involved many other facets of state control, 
authority, and functions.  It is evident by reading the Democratic Security and Defense 
Policy that the Colombian government has at least begun to come to grips with this issue.  
At the root of the problem is the lack of the government’s ability to exercise its authority 
and provide security throughout its territory.  This cannot be accomplished through 
military means alone.  An effective and fair judicial system is necessary as well as a 
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properly staffed, trained, and equipped police force.  The legitimacy of the government 
must be restored and the people must feel secure and confident that their government will 
provide for their security without unduly limiting their freedoms.   
The U.S. intervention El Salvador was not a situation where everything went 
perfectly well, yet the insurgency was eventually brought to an end.  The issues discussed 
above are worth considering and potentially applying to the U.S. aid being given to 
Colombia.  Both governments must be willing to learn and adapt their approaches as 
necessary to meet the situation.  If anything, insurgencies tend to be fluid situations 
which require constant analysis and adjustment to successfully combat.  The successful 
formula will require a tailored blend of military, police, judicial, economic, social, and 
diplomatic means. 
E.  THE SHINING PATH 
In the 1980’s, Sendero Luminoso (Sendero or Shining Path) became one of the 
most ruthless terrorist groups in the Western Hemisphere. Sendero waged war on the 
Peruvian state, while professing to a version of Maoist philosophy tailored to the Andean 
areas where it aimed to control.  The FMLN and Sendero’s similarities only exist in the 
fact that each guerilla movement posed an extremely intense challenge to their respective 
governments and states.  However, whereas the FMLN resembled previous Latin 
American guerrilla movements in important respects, in its ideology, strategy, and social 
base the Shining Path is more comparable to Cambodia’s Khmer Rouge which occurred 
from 1975-1979.  Sendero and the Khmer Rouge both attributed a fundamental role in the 
revolutionary process to political violence, and systematically terrorized and murdered 
not only military but also civilian opponents.131  Descriptions of both organizations 
highlight an unusual combination:  emotional rage and total confidence of their own 
morality against a pervasively corrupt society—joined with a tightly disciplined, well-
controlled military organization.132  It is important to emphasize the violent nature of 
Sendero Luminoso as it is comparable to that of the Khmer Rouge; however, what is 
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important to this thesis is to identify similarities and differences between the Shining Path 
of Peru as they pertain to the FARC of Colombia.   
In Colombia and Peru preconditions existed that were conducive to the emergence 
and expansion of a revolutionary insurgency.  Widespread poverty, unequal land 
distribution, large disparities in wealth, internal displacement, and an incomplete 
democratic system to address these problems form the primary framework in which the 
FARC and Sendero established and maintained their grip in their respective countries.  In 
contrast to Colombia, political variables in Peru were less significant in the development 
of the insurgency.  Analysts of the Shining Path agree that political exclusion was not a 
factor in Peru’s revolutionary equation.  David Scott Palmer argues: 
Sendero did not grow out of the national context of systematic and official 
repression or a systematic thwarting of opportunities for access to national 
politics…Democracy should have been a major bulwark against the 
advance of Shining Path in Peru.133 
Free and fair elections took place in Peru, and there was considerable civilian control 
over the military. Instead, the stimulant for revolution in Peru was the economic crisis.   
Although Palmer contends Sendero’s initial organization and growth occurred during “an 
extended period of economic growth and government expansion (1963-1975),” there 
remained an enormous disparity between the urban and rural areas.134  Land scarcity and 
distribution remained a huge problem among the peasantry and the most negative trend 
during the 1970’s.  The peasants did not fair well when it came to equal distribution which 
caused considerable resentment towards the Peruvian government.  In fact, among families 
who owned land, an overwhelming 83 percent of Peruvian families held fewer than five 
hectares; during this period the land distribution in Peru was the most unequal among fifty-
four nations for which data were reported.135  Another contributing factor to the growth of 
Sendero’s influence in the peasantry is attributed to a severe decline in living conditions.  
McClintock claims that “a subsistence crisis” ravaged Peru’s southern highland peasants 
during the 1970s and 1980s where conditions approximated famine; there were reports of 
consumption of as little as 420 calories per day; news reports documented cases of peasants 
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selling their children for $25.136  Interviews conducted by McClintock or her research teams 
in Peru revealed startling evidence of hunger within the peasantry as they expressed rage and 
despair about it: 
Here, they’ve forgotten us.  There’s no help.  Exactly the opposite—the 
cost of everything has risen too much, and that’s not the way to help.  
They’re killing the poor people.137 
The anger among the peasantry enabled Sendero to channel the hatred of the population 
and provoke the movement.  Like the FARC, many of the youth joined the insurgency 
because they resented the state, they hoped for a better life for themselves and their 
families, and they believed that Sendero could end the injustices sustained by the 
government.  However, the economic conditions continued to deteriorate at the end of the 
1980s and the early 1990s which furthered the cause of Sendero.   
In comparison to the FARC, Sendero Luminoso was organized into a hierarchical 
structure and led by one man: former philosophy professor Abimael Guzman Reyonoso, 
known by his followers as “Presidente Gonzalo.”  His dominant personality and 
authoritarian leadership style exemplified the organization’s violent nature with its ability 
to destroy both urban and rural organizations in its quest for power in Peru.  Although the 
Shining Path was founded by Guzman and originated in the late 1960’s, the guerrilla 
movement recruited and expanded for much of the 1970’s before mounting their armed 
offensive on the Peruvian state in May 1980.  
In contrast to the FARC, the majority of Sendero’s leadership was educated in 
universities and came from the middle or upper middle class.   In fact, like Guzman, 
many of the Sendero leaders were professors, schoolteachers or other professionals 
themselves and comprised the inner circle of the Shining Path which began to mobilize at 
the University Nacional de San Cristobal de Huamanga.  Sendero’s hierarchical 
organizational structure, which resembled the majority of revolutions in Latin America, 
initially limited their ability to recruit in the rural areas because the guerrillas and 
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peasants typically came from profoundly different “social worlds.”138  Some argue that 
university students from rural backgrounds who lived in cities, not peasants, were more 
susceptible to Guzman’s rhetoric than those living in remote jungles and highlands.  
However, Guzman was regarded like a “god” by his followers, who themselves behaved 
like disciples; Sendero assumed an almost cult-like identity.139 Because Guzman was 
placed on a pedestal and worshipped by his followers, the organization sustained a 
devastating blow when their “god” was captured in September 1992.  His iron rule of 
Sendero Luminoso came to an end after twenty-two years and to many of his followers, 
the capture of their godlike figure simply revealed an ordinary mortal.  “Not only was 
Sendero’s strategic capacity crippled, but also its mystique was almost destroyed.”140  On 
the other hand, the majority of the founding members of the FARC, including their leader 
Tirofijo, were born into peasant families who worked as farmers in the coffee growing 
regions of Colombia and banded together in the rural areas near the central Magdalena 
River valley.  These origins, according to Wickham-Crowley, made it unnecessary for the 
FARC to “bridge” the gap with the guerrillas and rural peasants because they were of the 
peasantry.141  Thus, recruitment and support for the FARC was much easier in the rural 
areas.  The discussion of the FARC’s organizational structure described in chapter one 
may be hierarchical like Sendero’s, but Tirofijo is not regarded as a “god” by his 
followers and many strategic decisions are made by his Secretariat or General Staff.  
Therefore, eliminating or capturing Tirofijo would not have the same impact on the 
FARC that capturing Guzman did on Sendero.  The FARC, with its numerous factions, 
would continue to have a strong presence and operational capability in Colombia. 
The FARC and Sendero follow similar ideologies with a few differences that are 
noteworthy.   The FARC adhere mostly to a Marxist-Leninist ideology much like the 
FMLN, while Sendero’s was mostly Maoist.  Guzman claimed that his ideology was the 
“fourth sword of Marxism,” a doctrine that was heir to Marxism, Leninism, and Maoism 
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but distinct from them.142  Guzman’s Maoist strategy for winning power in Peru included 
three key phases of guerrilla war:  first, “defensive”; then, “equilibrium”; and finally, 
“offensive.”143  The idea was to remain in the rural areas to gain support and momentum 
before making a final push to the city of Lima which served as Sendero’s final 
operational objective and a key element in the revolutions larger strategy of a protracted 
war.  “To control Lima would be to control the country, and for Sendero, control over 
Lima would be won by controlling the countryside.”144  However, in 1988 Guzman chose 
to forgo the Maoist strategy of remaining in the rural areas until the time was right to 
move into the urban areas and made a hasty decision to prioritize the war in the cities, in 
particular Lima.  Guzman’s decision met resistance from within the leadership of 
Sendero.  His wife, who led a faction of Sendero, and a top lieutenant named Osman 
Morote, argued that Guzman’s strategy to move the campaign towards the cities was 
premature, contradicted Maoism, support in the countryside was insufficient, and that 
urban action would excessively expose the organization’s leadership.145  Guzman wanted 
to seize power in Lima and moved into the city.  The decision proved futile as Guzman 
was captured in Lima in September 1992, and, as many analysts argue, ended the Shining 
Path.  Although remnants of Senderistas still exist, the threat to the Peruvian state is 
minimal. 
Alberto Fujimori officially became the President of Peru on 28 July 1990 and 
immediately restructured the Peruvian government’s approach to handling Sendero 
Luminoso and the country’s extensive economic problems.  The paramount problem of 
terrorism had first to be addressed before widespread economic improvements would 
take hold and begin to function without the social, psychological and political distortions 
that Sendero caused.146  In order to restore people’s faith in the state’s ability to govern, 
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protect, and perform social responsibilities a strengthened state security system was vital.  
Therefore, on 5 April 1992 President Fujimori adopted a hard-lined counterinsurgency 
plan in which he dissolved Congress and suspended the constitution, declaring that he 
needed a freer hand to introduce more economic reforms, combat terrorism and drug 
trafficking and root out corruption; he also purged the judiciary, dismissing 13 of 23 
Supreme Court justices and dozens of other judges.147  In what is termed an autogolpe 
(auto-coup or self-coup) against his own government, Fujimori wanted to increase his 
own power and control.  Although there were mixed reactions from the international 
community, there was little initial domestic resistance of the autogolpe, in fact it was 
welcomed.  Despite the complete illegality of his measures, public approval levels 
reached as high as 77 percent.148  This support signaled the confidence that the Peruvian 
people were willing to place in the new president and a new system to counter terrorism; 
this faith directly countered the weak popular backing of Sendero in many areas and in 
some ways was perceived as legitimizing Fujimori’s hard-lined response to the 
insurgency.149   
In a government integrated strategy aimed at restoring order and authority in Peru, 
Fujimori used the lack of popular support for Sendero, amid public acknowledgement of 
the impact the insurgency was having on the country, and established rondas campesinas 
(peasant self defense groups).  Fujimori armed over 500 peasant communities by the end 
of 1992, recognizing the advantage of arming, training and maintaining military control 
over the “peasants’ natural self-interests.”150  The military was encouraged to develop a 
more cooperative and trusting relationship with the peasants.  However, the establishment 
of the rondas met some resistance from military officers who feared the peasants actual 
motives.  Many officers feared that the peasants did not actually oppose Sendero, and 
might use their weapons against the military instead of fighting the insurgents.  
Additionally, analysts feared the rondas may use their weapons against other 
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communities thus eliminating each other, or becoming easy targets for Sendero to wipe 
out.  In the end, Fujimori prevailed in what he argued was “the peasants right to defend 
themselves;” and the realization that the Peruvian government and military needed to use 
the peasants in the war against Sendero or lose crucial leverage in the countryside—the 
real battleground—to the insurgents.151  Insurgent activity declined from 1992 onwards, 
and Fujimori took credit for this development, claiming that his campaign had largely 
eliminated the terrorist threat.   
The methods used to eliminate Sendero Luminoso in the various towns and cities 
came under much criticism.  Critics argue the Peruvian military indulged in widespread 
human rights abuses, and that the vast majority of the victims were poor highland 
peasants caught in the crossfire between the military and the insurgents. The final report 
of the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission, published on 28 August 2003, 
revealed that while the majority of the atrocities committed between 1980 and 1995 were 
the work of the Shining Path, the Peruvian armed forces were also guilty of having 
destroyed villages and having murdered peasants, whom they suspected of supporting the 
insurgents. According to the report, although the greater percentage of deaths caused by 
the armed forces occurred during previous government, 69,280 people were killed or 
disappeared as a result of political violence; the peasantry was “the principal victim of the 
violence.”152  During the Fujimori administration the numbers decreased, with a shift in 
tactics away from general butchery and toward isolating support for the terrorists, with 
Army engineers building rural roads and schools.  Critics remained skeptical on the 
progress of decreased human rights violations during his tenure.   
Under Fujimori, the long-overdue judicial reform was finally achieved—but the 
reform was a double-edged sword, shifting policies against the rights of the accused and 
in favor of the state, and in particular the military, to such a degree that democratic 
principles were violated.153  Fujimori’s judicial reforms swung from the extreme of 
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incapable and ineffective to the extreme of prosecuting everyone suspected of supporting 
the insurgency, including many who had no association with Sendero.  Additionally, 
those accused of committing crimes of terrorism in Peru would be tried in civilian courts 
where the judges would be “faceless” [anonymous].  This was an appropriate measure in 
order to ensure protection of the judges from any reprisals that might occur.  However, 
the pendulum may have swung too far; of an estimated five thousand persons jailed for 
crimes of terrorism since 1992, an estimated 30 percent or more were actually 
innocent.154  Despite human rights violations that might have occurred, the elimination of 
Sendero provided a secure environment that allowed Fujimori to enact economic reforms. 
Fujimori’s bold and risky economic reform known as the “fujishock” plan 
enabled Peru to return to the good graces of the international community and were widely 
considered successful.  Under his “fujishock” plan, he eliminated subsidies, reduced 
tariffs, reformed the tax structure and negotiated a $2.1 billion financial package with the 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank; an astounding accomplishment due to the 
significant difficulties with the international financial community he inherited from his 
predecessors including an inflation level that had reached 7000 percent in 1990.155  
Analysts argue that the significant gains in the economic situation can be attributed to 
security improvements to the environment which included the elimination of Sendero 
Luminoso.   
The United States viewed Fujimori’s plan as authoritarian and extremely 
unorthodox.  In fact, while visiting the U.S. in search of financial aid, Fujimori was told 
that Peru must adopt a “relatively orthodox economic strategy” and stabilize 
hyperinflation before being permitted re-entrance into international financial community, 
meaning that these policies would have to be implemented prior to the granting of any 
international aid to Peru; and Fujimori’s meeting with IMF, World Bank, and Inter-
American Development Bank officials yielded similar results.156  The U.S. and 
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international community explained to Fujimori that if adjustments were made using their 
recommendations, these groups would help Fujimori and fully support him through 
financial aid.   
F.  CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 
In Colombia and Peru, guerrilla forces found preconditions in each country that 
enabled them to ignite revolutions with the ultimate goal formulated to overthrow the 
current regime and impose their own form of government.  In the cases of Colombia and 
Peru, insurgents found and perceived a weakened state apparatus which ultimately permit 
an attack on the state.  There is a clear correlation between the timing of the economic 
decline in Peru’s cities and the revolutionary movement’s expansion which also applies 
to the situation in Colombia.  Insurgents reason that chipping away—through attacks on 
civilians, infrastructure and armed forces—at the institutional framework that supports 
poverty, corruption and socioeconomic disparities will weaken or at least pressure 
governments to react and thus force societal change.157     
Government responses vary with the nature of the insurgencies and the 
circumstances that permit their development—economic and societal conditions, the 
regime type in power and the level of popular support for the government and the 
guerrillas.158  In Peru the government was able to enact economic reforms only after it 
had waged a sufficient campaign against the guerrillas and begun restoring people’s faith 
in the security situation.  Fujimori relied on the military to bolster an aggressive response 
to the insurgency and later a team of elite technocrats to configure an economic plan that 
ensured Peru’s reinsertion into the international financial system. 
Under Fujimori, an important aspect in the path towards peace was the enactment 
of judicial reform commensurate to the Sendero threat.  Previous administrations 
bolstered a miserable conviction rate of only 5 to 12 percent of those being tried for 
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terrorist acts compared to Fujimori’s 97 percent conviction rate.159  Prior to Fujimori’s 
judicial reform and similar to the case in Colombia, judges were bribed or intimidated by 
the guerrillas which resulted in less convictions. However, as mentioned above, the 
pendulum may have swung too far with convictions going from negligible to near total 
under Fujimori’s judicial reform.  In order to avoid human rights violations that haunted 
his administration, a judicial reform such as Fujimori’s must be fair, just, and without 
unduly limiting freedoms. 
Another significant lesson learned in the Peruvian case against Sendero can be 
attributed to the establishment of rondas:  armed peasant self-defense patrols in the 
countryside. The rondas enhanced the protection of civilians that were susceptible to 
extortion, coercion, or murder at the hands of Sendero.  McClintock argues:  “To a 
greater degree than virtually any other Latin American revolutionary movement, the 
Shining Path sought to eliminate civilians whom it decided were standing in its way and 
whom it could charge, justifiably or not, with corruption.”160  She continues:  “Although 
the Peruvian rondas were not without their flaws—and the relationship between the 
peasant ronderos and the military sponsors of the rondas has not always been clear—in 
most analysts’ judgments they were on balance very helpful.”161  The underlying 
principle of the rondas is that it placed the onus on and entrusted the communities to 
oppose the advocates of violence.  Colombia instituted a similar strategy with the 
establishment of the Soldados de mi Pueblo (“Home Guards”) that established state 
presence in affected areas.  Local forces had all the more impact, because the police, 
using the same approach, systematically established presence in every municipio (county) 
in the countryside.162   
The final lesson learned that can be attributed to the Peruvian case against 
Sendero is that human rights violations, right or wrong, must be avoided in a necessary 
attempt to restore governmental legitimacy in the eyes of the population.  Under 
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Fujimori, the burden was placed in the hands of the military and police to combat the 
insurgency in the countryside.  A person who was suspected of having any affiliation 
with Sendero was likely guilty until proven innocent.  Numerous atrocities occurred 
against innocent bystanders sparking human rights violations that plagued Fujimori’s 
administration.  The following quote is from a Peruvian officer summarizing his 
approach towards the insurgents: 
Human rights violations often stem from a combination of frustration and 
fear.  Say I’m an officer and I have a battle with Shining Path and I arrest 
15 guerillas….I know that if I take them to the judge, they’re going to go 
in one door and out the other, because the justice system doesn’t work.  
Then, I know that while they’re in custody they’re going to start claiming 
“human rights” and they might say something that would screw up my 
career.  And finally, I know that Shining Path believes in revenge, and if I 
send these people to jail they might come after my children, my wife, or 
me.  So I kill everybody.  No witnesses.163 
This quote summarizes the paradox that many people involved in 
counterinsurgency operations face.  On the one hand the insurgents must be rooted out 
and eliminated, but on the other hand you have to provide security for the population 
while protecting human rights.  The option the officer above chose eliminated insurgents, 
but undermined the confidence of the population and the legitimacy of the government.  
Actions such as this are simply counterproductive to a counterinsurgency campaign. 
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V. ANALYSIS OF COLOMBIA’S COUNTERINSURGENCY 
CAMPAIGN: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The case studies have highlighted lessons learned which bear consideration when 
examining the insurgency in Colombia.  The essential ingredient in a counterinsurgency 
seems to be an effective and well administered strategy that is pervasive from the top 
levels of government down to the grass-roots level.  This chapter analyzes Colombia’s 
counterinsurgency campaign through the application of a counterinsurgency model and 
by applying “best practices” gleaned from successful counterinsurgencies throughout 
history.  A cautionary note here is essential.  As was mentioned in the case studies 
chapter, it can be dangerous to oversimplify situations when applying lessons learned or 
when using a model to draw conclusions.  Conditions tend to be so unique in each 
situation that the extrapolation of ideas and conclusions from that particular situation to 
another can be tricky.  Anthony Cordesman in his work, Rethinking the Challenge of 
Counterinsurgency Warfare: Working Notes, cautions about the complexity and 
instability of counterinsurgency operations.  Cordesman says, “[We] can learn from past 
cases, but need to focus on the case at hand.”164  He also says, “[We must] accept the fact 
that situation is usually truly complex, and very country, time, threat, and ally 
specific.”165  Nevertheless, the application of models and practices from successful 
counterinsurgencies can prove beneficial so long as the differences and complexities of 
each situation are kept carefully in mind. 
A.  COUNTERINSURGENCY MODEL 
The following counterinsurgency model is taken from the article entitled, Patterns 
of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency by John A. Lynn; and the insurgency model figures 
and narratives describing the model are taken from this article.166  Lynn’s model captures 
the essential concepts of insurgency and counterinsurgency and effectively illustrates the 
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interplay between the insurgents, counterinsurgents and their mutual ultimate objective; 
control of the population.  Lynn’s caution about using historical cases is similar to 
Cordesman’s.  Lynn says, “The past does not supply us with rules, but it does alert us to 
important issues and dynamics.  The past can never substitute for knowledge of the 
current challenge, but it can help us interpret that challenge.”167 
Figure 4. shows Lynn’s model of basic insurgency and counterinsurgency.  “The 
model represents the country under examination as a box defined by geographic, ethnic, 
economic, social, cultural, and religious characteristics.  Inside the box are governments, 
counterinsurgent forces, insurgent leaders, insurgent forces, and the general population 
which is made up of three groups: those committed to the insurgents, those committed to 
the counterinsurgents, and those who simply wish to get on with their lives.”168  Outside 
of the box are external actors which sometimes provide support to the insurgents or 
counterinsurgents.  These external actors may be states or groups with a stake or interest 
in the situation. 
 
Figure 4.   Lynn’s basic pattern of insurgency and counterinsurgency.157 
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The various arrows around the boxes represent the use of direct force, intelligence 
flow, and reform which flow to, from, and are leveraged by the various participants.  The 
center population box represents the ultimate target of the insurgents and 
counterinsurgents, the neutral population.  On either side of the neutral population are the 
populations which support the counterinsurgents (the state) and insurgents respectively.  
Naturally the population sizes of all three groups ebbs and flows as time progresses and 
varies proportionately to the success or failure of either side.  The state and the insurgents 
battle for legitimacy in the eyes of the population.  The insurgents often play upon 
grievances the population has against the state to erode the state’s legitimacy.  The 
insurgents also attack and undermine the security of the population to demonstrate the 
inability of the state to provide for the population. 
Security seems to be the bedrock upon which the legitimacy of either side is 
based.  “The contesting party—whether government or rebel—that best guarantees 
security wins the majority’s support, however grudging.”169  Both sides have relative 
advantages and disadvantages over one another.  The insurgents generally are at a direct 
force disadvantage. The insurgents must gain strength and support over time to directly 
challenge the state.  The state normally begins with a force advantage, but also begins 
with an informational or intelligence disadvantage.  It is very easy for the insurgents to 
hide amongst a supportive or even passive population.  It is very difficult for the state to 
precisely know who the insurgents are, where they are hiding, and who is supporting 
them without greater popular support providing intelligence and information.   
Indiscriminate acts of force by the state (raids, arrests, detentions) aimed at 
eliminating the insurgents without precise intelligence is extremely counterproductive to 
the state.  “The use of violence leaves a deadly residue.  Those who are harmed or whose 
family and friends have been victimized do not embrace the perpetrators of violence but 
harbor hatred and seek retribution against them.”170  Thus the foundation of an effective 
counterinsurgency strategy is not the heavy-handed application of force, but providing 
security for the population and instituting change to address grievances.  This in turn 
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provides a greater flow of intelligence and information from the population about the 
identity and whereabouts of the insurgents and their supporters.  Once this intelligence is 
obtained then the “focused” application of force may be used to avoid victimizing the 
innocent and neutral population. 
Outside actors generally provide support in the form of money and supplies but 
sometimes support is provided in the form of military advisers.  Outside support to the 
counterinsurgents (the state) is of the type generally provided by the U.S. such as that 
provided to Vietnam and El Salvador.  The most effective means of neutralizing this type 
of support is to turn sentiment in the supporting country (the U.S. in this case) against the 
intervention.  This was the case in Vietnam when mounting casualties and costs eroded 
public support for the war.  Outside support to the insurgents is normally in the form of 
supplies such as weapons and money.  In some instances combatants from outside powers 
have fought on foreign soil as insurgents, though this practice is often self-limiting.  
Large numbers of foreign troops fighting on the side of insurgents is tantamount to an 
invasion, not an insurgency.171 “Because outside aid for insurgents is primarily material 
support, the best way to stop it is by interdicting the flow of equipment, not undermining 
popular support within the outside power.  This fight is more physical than political.”172 
Figure 5. shows the model during a successful insurgency.  Outside support to the 
counterinsurgents (the state) has eroded.  Large-scale military actions and actions outside 
the law (indiscriminate use of force) by the counterinsurgents have undermined the 
legitimacy of the state.  The state has ignored the grievances of the population and not 
instituted reform.  The neutral population has swayed heavily in favor of the insurgents.  
Security for the population has eroded and the critical flow of intelligence from the 
population to the counterinsurgents has either severely decreased or been completely 
disrupted.  The lack of intelligence only exacerbates the problem because the government 
must rely on unfocused large-scale attacks.  A larger portion of the neutral population 
becomes victimized by these unfocused attacks and is driven into the waiting arms of the 
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insurgents.  The insurgents gain a force, intelligence, and support advantage because of 
the state’s blundering and inability to apply an effective counterinsurgency strategy. 
  
Figure 5.   Lynn’s model of successful insurgency.157 
 
Figure 6. illustrates a successful counterinsurgency.  In this depiction of Lynn’s 
model, the counterinsurgents have managed to employ a strategy not only of military and 
police action, but one of reform which has addressed grievances of the population.  This 
reform has bolstered the state’s legitimacy and undermined the legitimacy of the 
insurgents.  Providing security for the population has been the basis of this 
counterinsurgency strategy and the population rewards the state with increased popular 
support and the intelligence vital to conduct focused operations.  These focused 
operations minimize noncombatant casualties and serve to foster public confidence in the 
state.  The flow of outside support to the counterinsurgents has been interdicted and the 
insurgents receive less support from the greater population as well.  The insurgents 
become more and more isolated as their support base dwindles.  The insurgents are seen 
more as outlaws and outsiders and their numbers dwindle.  Eventually they either 
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negotiate a settlement of some form with the state or may cease to function as an 
insurgent organization. 
 
Figure 6.   Lynn’s model of successful counterinsurgency.157 
 
B.  HOW COLOMBIA COMPARES TO THE MODEL 
In the four decades prior to Uribe assuming the presidency in Colombia, the 
insurgency intensified from a small movement in the 1960s and finally reached its zenith 
during the Pastrana administration in the late 1990s.  The insurgents were ceded a large 
demilitarized zone which they used to strengthen their position and grasp within 
Colombia.  The model of successful insurgency in Figure 5. best illustrates the situation 
in Colombia during the Pastrana administration.  Until Plan Colombia was enacted, very 
little outside support was provided to the government of Colombia.  In fact, even after 
Plan Colombia became a reality, the majority of the aid was initially restricted to 
counternarcotics activities.  The Colombian military prior to the Pastrana administration 
was largely incapable of conducting counterinsurgency operations.  In the late 1990s, the 
Colombian military suffered many embarrassing defeats at the hands of the FARC.  
Government presence in the rural areas where the insurgents existed was minimal or 
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nonexistent.  The Colombian government was focused on large-scale unfocused military 
attacks against the insurgents which served to drive a wedge further between the 
population and the state.  The military’s defeats did not bolster public confidence in the 
state at all.  The government failed to address public grievances and did not institute 
effective reforms.  Security of the population was abysmal as was evidenced by the huge 
number of insurgent attacks throughout Colombia.   
Under Uribe and his Democratic Security and Defense Policy, the tide has begun 
to turn towards Lynn’s model of successful counterinsurgency in Figure 6.  As discussed 
in chapter II, the military had begun transforming itself into a more effective 
counterinsurgency force.  The policy has put the security of the population and the 
strengthening of state institutions at the forefront of government priorities.  The 
government has instituted reform to address grievances of injustice and lack of 
governmental presence.  The general population in Colombia feels more secure now than 
they have in quite a long time.  Public confidence in the government and approval of 
Uribe’s actions is extremely high.173  The government’s efforts to demobilize the right-
wing paramilitaries have met with some success.  The legitimacy of the state has been 
bolstered amongst the population and the legitimacy of the insurgents continues to 
decline as they continue their terrorist attacks on the population and key infrastructure.  
Though the FARC remains ideologically committed to its Communist underpinnings, the 
insurgents are seen more and more as outlaws and outsiders, especially with their ties to 
the drug trade.  The Colombian government has begun providing security in places where 
it was nonexistent and establish trust with the population. 
The single factor which seems to make the insurgency in Colombia unique from 
many other historical examples is the funding of the insurgents through the narcotics 
trade and other crimes.  The FARC needs very little outside support since it is capable of 
generating an estimated $332 million of income through illicit means, as noted in chapter 
three.  Where insurgents in other countries relied heavily upon outside actors for money, 
weapons, and supplies, the insurgents in Colombia are more or less self-sustaining 
through their criminal activities.  Fortunately, especially from the U.S. perspective, the 
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same steps taken by the government to battle the insurgents should alleviate the narcotics 
issue as well.  In fact, a strong stable government with excellent popular support will be 
much more effective at dealing with the illegal drug trade.  Colombia’s priorities are 
correct.  Security and political stability come first; economic stability and curbing the 
illegal drug trade will follow. 
C.   SUCCESSFUL COUNTERINSURGENCY PRACTICES 
A government’s counterinsurgency strategy is contingent on the nature of the 
revolution and the particulars to their country—economic and societal conditions, the 
regime type in power and the level of popular support for the government and the 
insurgents; a template simply does not exist.  A successful counterinsurgency campaign 
like the one in Peru against the Shining Path or in El Salvador against the FMLN may not 
succeed in other countries; however, it is important to understand the nature of these 
insurgencies that may contribute to the development of successful operational practices 
that could be used in Colombia against the FARC.  Root causes of insurgencies can be 
attributed to a variety of reasons, but the core problems revolve around a weakened state, 
loss of governmental authority, lack of security for the population, and the lack of an 
adequate state response to the effects of poverty; and to insurgents, perceptions of state 
weakness ultimately permit an attack on the state.174  In his work Best Practices in 
Counterinsurgency, Kalev I. Sepp, assistant professor at the Department of Defense 
Analysis, Naval Postgraduate School, addresses a historical view of government 
responses to revolutions during the twentieth century.  Sepp suggests that if we were able 
to combine all the successful operational practices from a century of counterinsurgent 
warfare, the summary would suggest a campaign outline to combat present day 
insurgents.175  Here is a list of successful and unsuccessful operational practices 
according to Sepp: 
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Successful Unsuccessful 
• Emphasis on Intelligence.  • Primacy of military direction of 
counterinsurgency. 
• Focus on population, their needs, and security. • Priority to “kill-capture” enemy, not engaging 
population. 
• Secure areas established, expanded. • Batallion-size operations as the norm 
• Insurgents isolated from population (population 
control). 
• Military units concentrated on large bases for 
protection. 
• Single authority (charismatic/dynamic leader). • Special Forces focused on raiding. 
• Effective, pervasive psychological operations 
(PSYOP) campaign 
• Adviser effort a low priority in personnel 
assignment 
• Amnesty and rehabilitation for insurgents. • Building, training indigenous army in image of 
U.S. Army. 
• Police in lead; military supporting. • Peacetime government processes. 
• Police force expanded, diversified. • Open borders, airspace, coastlines. 
• Conventional military forces reoriented for 
counterinsurgency. 
 
• Special Forces, advisers embedded with indigenous 
forces. 
 
• Insurgent sanctuaries denied.  
Table 1 Best Practices in Counterinsurgency176 
Many of these “best practices” have been and can be applied to the current situation in 
Colombia and President Uribe’s ongoing struggle against the FARC. 
A key component of a successful counterinsurgency operation is a charismatic, 
dynamic, and persistent leader willing to assume control of the government and 
implement a successful strategy.  The requirement for exceptional leadership during an 
internal war calls for a leader with enthusiasm and imagination; and emergency 
conditions dictate that a government needs a single, fully empowered executive to direct 
and coordinate counterinsurgency efforts.177  The Shining Path case study discussed in 
chapter four is a perfect example of a leader, Fujimori, who granted himself executive 
authority through his autogolpe to combat the insurgents.  Although his hard-line 
approach was heavily criticized as extreme including numerous human rights violations 
and mass corruption, Fujimori’s approval rating soared as the population welcomed his 
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aggressive counterinsurgency approach.  Fujimori’s ability to wipe out Sendero 
Luminoso is indisputable.  Alvaro Uribe has taken a hard-line approach against the FARC 
as well through his Democratic Security and Defense Policy that was discussed in chapter 
three.  To reiterate, the general objective of the Democratic Security and Defense Policy 
is to strengthen and guarantee the rule of law throughout Colombia, through the 
reinforcement of democratic authority.178  In order to implement his policy, Uribe 
established the National Defense and Security Council which will be the forum where the 
President will liaise with his ministers, the armed forces, and the national police.  The 
council will issue directives, supervise the implementation of each, and evaluate the 
results.  Like Fujimori, President Uribe’s approach faces criticisms of human rights 
violations, but many people feel that he is tackling the problem head-on and the country 
is more secure as a result.179  President Uribe’s approval rating has soared to over 80 
percent in 2005, and the population’s perception about the conflict is changing.  In an 
insurgency that has lasted for over forty years, this change in attitude in itself is 
extremely important. 
The first priority the Colombian government should focus on is the security and 
needs of the population.  Sepp argues:  “The security of the people must be assured as a 
basic need, along with food, water, shelter, health care, and a means of living; these are 
human rights, along with freedom of worship, access to education, and equal rights for 
women.180  Devin Finn echoes this argument by stating:  “Restoration of state security 
and protection of citizens is necessary before governments can begin to rebuild political 
and economic institutions and gain popular support.181  The current aim of the Uribe 
administration is to disarm strategic actors and “simplify the conflict” in an attempt to 
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restore people’s faith in state legitimacy and institutions, and achieve a heightened degree 
of security through defeat of the insurgents.  Uribe’s top two strategic objectives 
according to his Democratic Security and Defense Policy include consolidation of state 
control throughout Colombia and protection of the population.  Both objectives are aimed 
at driving the people away from the insurgents, and closer to the government.  Ann 
Mason, professor of Political Science at the University of the Andes in Bogotá, argues 
that preliminary evidence suggests some progress has been made on the security agenda, 
however, Uribe must move forward aggressively to provide effective, and equal, 
protection of human and civil rights.182  If the Uribe administration is serious about 
winning the hearts and minds of the Colombian population, then providing security for 
the people is an essential ingredient.   
In order to protect the population from threats to its security there needs to be an 
emphasis on intelligence.  Intelligence operations that help detect insurgents for arrest 
and prosecution are the single most important practice to achieve the goal of security.183  
As mentioned in Chapter III, Uribe’s policy establishes a Joint Intelligence Committee to 
coordinate among the state’s intelligence services.  The idea is to consolidate strategic 
level intelligence, eliminate interagency turf battles, and eliminate redundancy.  
Additionally, regional intelligence committees will be set up at local levels to accomplish 
the same tasks down at the grass roots level.  Sepp argues that at the community level, 
honest, trained, robust police forces responsible for security are a tremendous asset for 
gathering intelligence.184  To bolster intelligence gathering capabilities, Uribe increased 
the size of the national police.  The strengthening of the national police includes: 
extending coverage to more municipalities, increase of patrols in rural areas, the creation 
of new mobile Carabinero Squadrons, building and fortifying rural police stations, 
strengthening the highway police, creating regular auxiliaries, and promoting the work of 
and collaboration with civic police; all of which increase the capabilities of the police to 
gather intelligence.  The creation of the Joint Intelligence Committee and the use of the                                                  
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national police as information collectors improve the entire intelligence system at the 
strategic, operational, and tactical level.   
The increased size and presence of the national police in the rural areas including 
their more expansive role as intelligence collectors also contributes to the practice of 
population control.  Additionally, Uribe strengthened the role of the soldados de mi 
pueblo which enabled more soldiers from rural areas to perform their military service in 
their own regions; and this allows them to retain their links with the community and will 
strengthen the trust between the population and the security forces.185  These “home 
guards” have a higher stake in providing security to the population of their own villages 
than a community from which they were not raised.  A trusting relationship between the 
population and security forces will improve the transfer of information which could 
promote the capture of the insurgents.  The objective is to keep the insurgents isolated 
from the population by all means possible because, according to Sepp, insurgents rely on 
members of the population for concealment, sustenance, and recruits.186  In addition, the 
insurgents use the communities as sanctuaries in which to organize, plan, and execute 
terrorist attacks.  The increased presence of the national police and soldados de mi pueblo 
and their improved relationship with the population denies the insurgents of these “safe 
havens” in which to mobilize. 
The introduction of an effective, pervasive psychological operations (PSYOP) 
campaign could serve two purposes for President Uribe.  On one hand, informational 
campaigns could explain to the population what they can do to help their government 
make them secure from terrorist insurgents; encourage participation in the political 
process by voting in local and national elections; and communicates directly to the 
peasants in the rural areas the governments intent on combating the guerrillas.187  For 
example, something as simple as a radio broadcast, a flyer, or leaflets with an applicable 
“theme” could reassure the rural population that the government is acting in their best 
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interest to provide security for the peasants in the local areas.  On the other hand, another 
applicable “theme” could convince insurgents they can best meet their personal interests 
and avoid risk of imprisonment or death by reintegrating themselves into the population 
through amnesty, rehabilitation, or by laying down their weapons and simply not 
fighting.188  In both cases, the goal for Uribe is to encourage the population to move 
towards the government and away from the insurgents.  In the Democratic Security and 
Defense Policy, the government states that it will keep the public fully informed of 
developments in all areas relating to the policy in order to boost confidence and 
encourage citizen co-operation and solidarity.189  However, caution must be taken when 
conducting effective psychological operations.  The message conveyed to the population 
and insurgents cannot be “empty” words; and action must be taken to carry out the 
message’s intent.  If the government states that amnesty will be provided for insurgent’s 
who stop fighting, then that’s what should occur.  Failure by the government to take 
action on its words in a PSYOP campaign can severely discredit the administration and 
have negative consequences.  A successful PSYOP campaign is an ongoing process in 
which the Uribe administration could conduct more aggressively.  
The overall objective of the government’s strategy in counterinsurgency 
operations is to win the support of the population.  As Sepp notes:  “The focus of all civil 
and military plans and operations must be on the center of gravity in any conflict—the 
country’s people and their belief in and support of the government.”190  Many 
counterinsurgency strategies focus on finding, capturing, and killing the leader(s) of the 
revolution.  In the case of Peru and the Shining Path, the capture of Abimael Guzman 
dealt a crippling blow to the insurgency; however, the same strategy would not produce 
similar results in Colombia, since the FARC’s leadership is considerably more 
diversified.  Based on the best practices discussed here, it is clear that Colombia is 
applying many of them through the Democratic Security and Defense Policy. 
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D.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
There is hope for Colombia.  After decades of a seemingly interminable 
insurgency, President Uribe has put Colombia on the correct path towards recovery 
through the implementation of the Democratic Security and Defense Policy.  The caution 
here is that his plan is necessary but not sufficient in and of itself. Based on the 
application of the counterinsurgency model and the best practices from past successful 
counterinsurgencies, Colombia seems to be applying the correct methodology towards 
solving this crisis.  It has been repeated throughout this work that an effective 
counterinsurgency campaign takes time to truly be effective.  President Uribe realizes this 
and has communicated it to the people of Colombia.  His high approval ratings and the 
recent passage of legislation to allow a president to serve consecutive terms in Colombia 
means he will likely serve a second term and continue with his strategy.  It is extremely 
important that the measures put in place by the current administration be allowed to work 
long-term.  It is equally important that this policy be reevaluated and adjusted as 
necessary based on the evolving situation.  The insurgents have shown remarkable 
adaptability to changing situations and the government must also learn to adapt as the 
situation warrants. 
1. Recommendations for Colombian Policy 
The Colombian government must deal with the issue of human rights abuses 
head-on.  The Democratic Security and Defense Policy emphasizes the importance of this 
issue and the government needs to follow through with its promise to uphold human 
rights and punish abusers.  The failure to effectively deal with human rights abuses will 
probably undo any progress made and undermine the legitimacy of the government. 
Reform of the judicial system must also be carried out.  This is a linchpin in restoring 
security and public confidence in state institutions.  The demobilization of the 
paramilitary forces must continue within the framework of the law.  Those guilty of 
crimes and human rights abuses must be punished within the limits of the law.  
The military has begun the process of transformation to combat the insurgents. 
The Colombian government must follow through and ensure the transition from military 
to civilian control in retaken areas.  Historical examples of effective counterinsurgencies 
have shown that an effective police presence supported by the military is crucial. As 
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noted in the Best Practices of Counterinsurgency by Kalev Sepp, successful strategies 
take place when the police are in the lead and the military supporting; and the police 
force has expanded and is more diversified.191  Negotiations with and reintegration of the 
insurgents into society will be necessary.  Uribe has left the door open for negotiations 
with insurgents who agree to a strict cessation of hostilities.  Programs must be instituted 
to begin the process of reintegrating the combatants as functioning and contributing 
members of society.  Steps must be taken to provide the same basic rights enjoyed by 
Colombians in general to the demobilized insurgents.  Without a guarantee of safety and 
due process, no insurgent is going to be willing to lay down their weapons.   
The Colombian government has taken the necessary first steps towards resolving 
the problem, but is still a long way from ending the conflict.  The strengthening of civil 
institutions and governance in the rural areas must continue for the true underlying causes 
to be dealt with.  The geographical and terrain limitations of Colombia’s outlying rural 
areas intensify the problem of effective governance and security.  The military and 
especially the police forces must become more mobile and adaptable to reach and work in 
these areas.   
2. Recommendations for United States Policy 
The most important change to U.S. policy would be to shift priorities to put 
internal stability and security for Colombia as the highest priority.  As discussed in 
Chapter III, the availability, price, and purity of illegal narcotics has not changed since 
the implementation of Plan Colombia.  Proponents of the program point to the high 
numbers of hectares of coca that have been eradicated under Plan Colombia.  This is 
perhaps the wrong metric to measure the success of Plan Colombia since it appears that 
drug production and easy availability continues despite coca eradication efforts.  Perhaps 
the U.S. needs to look inward and focus on the demand side of the drug problem and not 
the supply side. 
As an outside power, the U.S. cannot fight and win this war for the Colombians.  
The U.S. can play an important supporting role through monetary aid and other forms of 
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assistance.  The U.S. can vigorously support the Colombians in their efforts to deal with 
human rights issues.  Further economic aid can be conditionally tied to strict compliance 
with human rights issues as was the case in El Salvador.  Since the U.S. possesses a 
robust legal system, perhaps advisers from the U.S. with expertise in judicial matters can 
be sent to Colombia to aid in reforming its judicial system.  Alternative development and 
crop substitutions would help draw some of the poor peasant farmers and laborers from 
the lure of coca growing.  The U.S. can also assist and encourage negotiation efforts with 
the combatants to ensure guarantees of truth, justice, and reparations are followed 
through by all parties.  The assistance spoken of here deals more with infrastructure and 
government presence than with assistance of a military nature.  The U.S. needs to help 
Colombia help itself.  The greatest U.S. contribution could be money that is not 
conditionally tied to counternarcotics efforts, but made available to establish and 
maintain the infrastructure that is critical to the state and providing security for its people.  
“In security lies the support of the majority and the environment in which a new and 
better state may emerge.”192  This “new and better state” will be better equipped and 





                                                 
192 John A. Lynn, “Patterns of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” Military Review (July-August 
2005), available on <http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/download/English/JulAug05/ 
lynn.pdf>, accessed on 25 August 2005, 27. 
77 
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Aviles, William. “Institutions, Military Policy, and Human Rights in Colombia,” Latin 
American Perspectives (January 2001). 
Bacevich, A. J., James D. Hallums, Richard H. White, Thomas F. Young. American 
Military Policy in Small Wars: The Case of El Salvador, McLean, VA: 
Pergamon-Brassey’s International Defense Publishers, Inc., 1988. 
Byrne, Hugh. El Salvador’s Civil War: A Study of Revolution. Boulder, CO: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1996. 
Christman, Daniel W., John G. Heimann, and Julia E. Sweig, “Andes 2020: A New 
Strategy for the Challenges of Colombia and the Region,” Council on Foreign 
Relations Center® Inc. (2004), available from <http://www.cfr.org/content/ 
publications/attachments/Andes2020.pdf?jsessionid=c94392d4fda48d3782165a8b
23ff81cd>, accessed on 14 July 2005. 
Colombia Human Rights Network Online, “An Overview of Recent Colombian History,” 
available from <http://colhrnet.igc.org/timeline.htm>, accessed on 13 October 
2005. 
Cope, John A. “Colombia’s War: Toward a New Strategy,” Strategic Forum, Institute for 
National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, No. 194, (October 
2002), available from <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/strforum/SF194/SF194.pdf>, 
accessed on 12 July 2005. 
Cordesman, Anthony. “Rethinking the Challenge of Counterinsurgency Warfare: 
Working Notes,” Center for Strategic and International Studies Online, (7 
November 2005), available from <http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/ 
051107_counterinsurg.pdf>, accessed on 8 November 2005. 
Davies, Roy. “The Rise and Fall of Alberto Fujimori: Biography of the President of Peru 
1990–2000,” available on  <http://www.ex.ac.uk/~RDavies/inca/fujimori.html>, 
accessed on 17 October 2005. 
Evans, Ernest. “El Salvador’s lessons for future U.S. interventions,” World Affairs 
(Summer 1997). 
FARC-EP online, available from http://www.farcep.org/; Internet; accessed on 25 July 
2005. 
Finn, Devin. “Following the Shining Path of Peru to the Road Not Taken in Colombia” 
(October 2004), available from <http://www.duke.edu/web/las/Council/wpapers/ 
workingpaperFinn.pdf>, accessed on 3 October 2005. 
Graham, Bob, Brent Scowcroft and Michael Shifter, Toward Greater Peace and Security 
in Colombia, Forging a Constructive U.S. Policy. Council on Foreign Relations 
Press (October 2000), available from <http://www.cfr.org/publication/3828/ 
toward_greater_peace_and_security_in_colombia.html>, accessed on 12 August 
2005. 
78 
Haugaard, Lisa, Adam Isacson, Kimberly Stanton, John Walsh, Jeff Vogt, “Blueprint for 
a New Colombia Policy” Center for International Policy online (March 2005). 
available from <http://www.ciponline.org/colombia//0503blueprint.pdf>, 
accessed on 12 August 2005. 
Isacson, Adam. “Congress Doubles the Limit on U.S. Troops in Colombia” (8 October 
2004), available from Center for International Policy Online, available from  
<http://www.ciponline.org/colombia/041008cap.htm>, accessed on 14 July 2005. 
Isacson, Adam. “Failing Grades: Evaluating the Results of Plan Colombia,” Yale Journal 
of International Affairs (Summer/Fall 2005), available from <http://www.yale 
.edu/yjia/articles/Vol_1_Iss_1_Summer2005/IsacsonFinal.pdf >, accessed on 11 
October 2005. 
Jawahar, Vinay. “Turning Point in Colombia?,” Rapporteur’s Report,  Inter-American 
Dialogue 2004. available from <http://www.thedialogue.org/publications/ 
country_studies/colombia/cwg_june04.pdf>, accessed on 14 August 2005. 
Joes, Anthony J. America and Guerrilla Warfare. Lexington, KY: The University Press 
of Kentucky, 2000. 
Johnson, Chalmers A. Revolutionary Change, 2nd ed. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press, 1982. 
Lynn, John A. “Patterns of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” Military Review (July-
August 2005), available on <http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/CAC/milreview/ 
download/English/JulAug05/lynn.pdf>, accessed on 25 August 2005. 
Manwaring, Max B. U.S. Security Policy in the Western Hemisphere: Why Colombia, 
Why Now, and What Is To Be Done?, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 
U.S. Army War College, 2001. 
Manwaring, Max B. Shadows of Things Past and Images of the Future: Lessons for the 
Insurgencies in Our Midst, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army 
War College, 2004. 
Marcella, Garbriel. “The U.S. Engagement with Colombia:  Legitimate State Authority 
and Human Rights,” The North-South Agenda (March 2002), available from 
http://www.ciaonet.org/wps/mag02/mag02.pdf , accessed 12 August 2005. 
Marcella, Gabriel. The United States and Colombia: The Journey From Ambiguity To 
Strategic Clarity. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 
College, 2003. 
Marks, Thomas A. Colombian Army Adaptation to FARC Insurgency. Carlisle, PA: 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002. 
Marks, Thomas A. Sustainability of Colombian Military/Strategic Support for 
“Democratic Security.” Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 
College, 2005. 
Mason, Ann. “Colombia’s Democratic Security Agenda: Public Order in the Security 
Tripod,” Security Dialogue, vol. 34, no. 4 (December 2003). 
79 
McClintock, Cynthia. Revolutionary movements in Latin America: El Salvador’s FMLN 
& Peru’s Shining Path. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 
1998. 
McCormick, Gordon H. From the Sierra to the Cities:  The Urban Campaign of the 
Shining Path.  Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1992. 
Metz, Steven. Counterinsurgency: Strategy and the Phoenix of American Capability. 
Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1995. 
Migdal, Joel S. Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State 
Capabilities in the Third World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1988. 
Ministerio de Defensa Nacional online. Democratic Security and Defense Policy, 
Presidency of the Republic-Ministry of Defense, available from 
<http://alpha.mindefensa.gov.co/descargas/Documentos_Home/Seguridad%20De
mocratica.pdf>, accessed 13 July 2005. 
Montgomery, Tommie Sue. Revolution in El Salvador: From Civil Strife to Civil Peace, 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995. 
Nagle, Luz E. The Search for Accountability and Transparency in Plan Colombia: 
Reforming Judicial Institutions—Again. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 
U.S. Army War College, 2001. 
Nationmaster online, available at <http://www.nationmaster.com/cat/Crime>; Internet; 
accessed 7 November 2005. 
Newbold, Samantha. The Fujishock: How and Why Did It Occure? An Analysis of 
Alberto Fujimori’s Policy Reversal of 1990, available from 
<http://www.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/clas/ Pubs/entre2003/Fujishock.html>, 
accessed on 7 December 2005. 
Nuñez, Joseph R. Fighting the Hobbesian Trinity in Colombia: A New Strategy for 
Peace. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2001. 
Palmer, David Scott. ed. The Shining Path of Peru. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992. 
Passage, David. The United States and Colombia: Untying the Gordian Knot, Carlisle, 
PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, March 2000, available 
from <http//www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=30> 
accessed on 12 August 2005. 
Powell, Colin L. Keynote address to the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced 
International Studies (SAIS), 60th Anniversary Gala Dinner 13 October 2004. 
Embassy of the United States, London – UK Online, available from 
<http://www.usembassy.org.uk/terror525.html> accessed 1 August 2005. 
Rabasa, Angel and Peter Chalk. Colombian Labyrinth: The Synergy of Drugs and 
Insurgency and Its Implications for Regional Stability. Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 
2001. 
80 
Rempe, Dennis. The Past as a Prologue?: A History of U.S. Counterinsurgency Policy in 
Colombia, 1958-66. Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War 
College, 2002. 
Sepp, Kalev I. “Best Practices in Counterinsurgency,” Military Review (May-June 2005), 
available from <http://usacac.leavenworth.army.mil/cac/milreview/download/ 
English/MayJun05/sepp.pdf>, accessed 25 August 2005. 
Serafino, Nina M. Colombia: Current Issues and Historical Background. New York: 
Nova Science Publishers, Inc., 2003. 
Shifter, Michael and Vinay Jawahar. “State Building in Colombia: Getting Priorities 
Straight.” Journal of International Affairs (Fall 2004, vol. 58, no. 1.), available 
from <http://www.thedialogue.org/publications/oped/dec04/shifter_fall04.pdf>, 
accessed on 21 September 2005.  
Sprunk, Darren D. “Transformation in the Developing World:  An Analysis of 
Colombia’s Security Transformation” Masters Thesis, The Naval Postgraduate 
School, 2004; Monterey, California. 
Stough, Michael S. “Tightening the Screws: Restoring Security in Colombia,” 
Washington D.C., National Defense University, National War College, available 
from </http://www.ndu.edu/library/n4/n035601j.pdf>, accessed on 14 September 
2005. 
Sweig, Julia E. “What Kind of War for Colombia?,” Foreign Affairs (September/October 
2002). 
Teicher, Dario E. The Decisive Phase of Colombia’s War on Narco-Terrorism. Maxwell 
AFB, AL: USAF Counterproliferation Center, Air University, 2005. 
The World Factbook online, available from <http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/ 
factbook/>, accessed 7 November 2005. 
Thoumi, Francisco E. Illegal Drugs, Economy, and Society in the Andes. Washington 
D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2003. 
United Nations Development Program, National Human Development Report: Solutions 
to Escape the Conflict’s Impasse 2003, table 12.1., available from 
<http://www.pnud.org.co/2003/EnglishVersion/Chapter12.pdf>, accessed 11 
August 2005. 
U.S. Department of State online, 2001 Report on Foreign Terrorists, available from 
<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rpt/fto/2001/5258.htm>, accessed 11 August 2005. 
Veillette, Connie. “CRS Report for Congress,” Colombia: Issues for Congress, 19 
January 2005. 
Veillette, Connie. “CRS Report for Congress,” Plan Colombia: A Progress Report, 22 
June 2005. 
81 
Villalobos, Joaquín. “Colombia: Negotiate, But What?,” Rapporteur’s Report,  Inter-
American Dialogue June 2002. available from <http://www.thedialogue.org/ 
publications/country_studies/colombia_villalobos.pdf>, accessed on 12 June 
2005. 
Wickham-Crowley, Timothy P. Guerrillas & Revolution in Latin America. Princeton, NJ: 
















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
83 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Ft. Belvoir, Virginia  
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, California  
 
